[认识论（pramāṇa-śāstra）属于梵文文学的流行学派，经过了20个世纪，一直在不同哲学学派中发展。各个学派在认识论问题上争论不休，但没有人独立地将各种知识理论进行编写定义，这些理论包括：各种古典系统(darśana)、现实主义和理想主义、二元论和一元论、有神论者和无神论者等等]。而从早期的十几所大学，其中每一所大学，如知道和理由，就像佛教怀疑论者（Prasaṅgika）一样，攻击别人的理论。然而，有许多共同的认识论假设或态度，其中最引人注目的是在信仰问题的理由的焦点。主流古典印度认识论由关于血统的理论主导，即关于知识生成过程的观点，称为pramāṇa，“知识来源”。主要候选人是感知，推理和见证。其他过程似乎不是真实有益的，也可以被减少到一个或多个广泛接受的来源，如感知和推理。然而，令人惊讶的候选人，例如非感知（缺乏知识）和间接暗示（捍卫与推论不同），特别是在后来的文本中引起了复杂的论证 - 从一些学校的梵文哲学作品开始的大约1000几乎呈指数增长。后来的文本提出了比后来的作者所学到的更复杂的观点和论点。古典印度哲学是梵文泛泛大学知识语言中不间断的反思传统。或者说，由于有不同的学校，所以它们包含了互锁的传统，所有这些都是使用梵文和与其他学校合作的。后来作者扩大和发扬了前辈的立场和论据。
[Theory of knowledge, pramāṇa-śāstra, is a rich genre of Sanskrit literature, spanning almost twenty centuries, carried out in texts belonging to distinct schools of philosophy. Debate across school occurs especially on epistemological issues, but no author writes on knowledge independently of the sort of metaphysical commitment that defines the various classical systems (darśana), realist and idealist, dualist and monist, theist and atheist, and so on.] And every one of the dozen or so major schools from early in its history takes a position on knowledge and justification, if only, as with the Buddhist skeptic (Prasaṅgika), to attack the theories of others. There are nevertheless many common epistemological assumptions or attitudes, the most striking of which is a focus on a belief’s source in questions of justification. Mainstream classical Indian epistemology is dominated by theories about pedigree, i.e., views about knowledge-generating processes, called pramāṇa, “knowledge sources.” The principal candidates are perception, inference, and testimony. Other processes seem not truth-conducive or reducible to one or more of the widely accepted sources such as perception and inference. However, surprising candidates such as non-perception (for knowledge of absences) and circumstantial implication (defended as distinct from inference) provoke complex arguments especially in the later texts—from about 1000 when the number of Sanskrit philosophical works of some of the schools begins to proliferate almost exponentially. The later texts present more intricate views and arguments than the earlier from which the later authors learned. Classical Indian philosophy is an unbroken tradition of reflection expressed in the pan-Subcontinent intellectual language of Sanskrit. Or, we should say it is comprised of interlocking traditions since there are the distinct schools, all nevertheless using Sanskrit and engaging with the other schools. Later authors expand and carry forward positions and arguments of their predecessors.
Skepticism and the issue of whether knowledge that p entails that you know that you know that p are addressed as well as the question of the usefulness of knowledge not only for the purposes of everyday life but also the religious goal of world-transcendence, about which most schools take positions. The authority of testimony, among the candidate sources, is considered by some to have special religious importance. Others view yogic perception and/or meditative experience as crucial for religious knowledge, which is usually distinguished from the everyday knowledge analyzed in the textbooks of epistemology.
- Common Presuppositions of Classical Indian Schools
Commonalities in the classical Indian approaches to knowledge and justification frame the arguments and refined positions of the major schools. Central is a focus on occurrent knowledge coupled with a theory of “mental dispositions” called saṃskāra. Epistemic evaluation of memory, and indeed of all standing belief, is seen to depend upon the epistemic status of the occurrent cognition or awareness or awarenesses that formed the memory, i.e., the mental disposition, in the first place. Occurrent knowledge in turn must have a knowledge source, pramāṇa.
1.1 Knowledge and Knowledge Sources
翻译人员将印度认识论学派的技术术语的技术术语归结为技术术语，甚至不是技术性的英语和分析哲学，是对后者的无知。例如，最常见的是“jñāna”，用英语“知识”这个词来标准化（例如，Bhatt 1989）。然而，适当的梵语使用允许“假”，而没有虚假的知识，因为这些词在（分析）英语中使用。这里有一个更深层次的教训，那就是翻译者应该研究西方哲学，即教训，即尽管可能会有虚假的错误 - 让我们说“认知”：有真实和虚假的认知 - 这在日常演讲中通常被认为是如印度认识论者（除了少数例外，特别是，第二世纪的佛教徒Nāgārjuna和一些追随者，包括Śrīharṣa，十一世纪的Advaitin），认知通常是真实的或真实的。错误和虚假是偏离正常和自然的。也就是说，认知被认为是一种对话性违约的知识，所以将“知识”翻译成“知识”毕竟不是那么糟糕。当八世纪的AdvaitinŚaṅkara说，从精神知识（vidyā）的角度来看，我们在日常演讲中认识到的知识是虚幻的，“虚假的知识”，这应该被认为是几乎是矛盾的（Brahma-sūtra评论，序言）。错误和虚假是偏离正常和自然的。也就是说，认知被认为是一种对话性违约的知识，所以将“知识”翻译成“知识”毕竟不是那么糟糕。当八世纪的AdvaitinŚaṅkara说，从精神知识（vidyā）的角度来看，我们在日常演讲中认识到的知识是虚幻的，“虚假的知识”，这应该被认为是几乎是矛盾的（Brahma-sūtra评论，序言）。错误和虚假是偏离正常和自然的。也就是说，认知被认为是一种对话性违约的知识，所以将“知识”翻译成“知识”毕竟不是那么糟糕。当八世纪的AdvaitinŚaṅkara说，从精神知识（vidyā）的角度来看，我们在日常演讲中认识到的知识是虚幻的，“虚假的知识”，这应该被认为是几乎是矛盾的（Brahma-sūtra评论，序言）。
A common failure of translators rendering the technical terms of the Indian epistemological schools into the technical terms, or even not so technical, of English and analytic philosophy, is ignorance of the latter. For example, several words, the most common of which is ‘jñāna’, are standardly rendered with the word ‘knowledge’ in English (e.g., Bhatt 1989). However, proper Sanskrit usage allows “false” jñāna, whereas there is no false knowledge as the words are used in (analytic) English. There is a deeper lesson here than that translators should study Western philosophy, the lesson, namely, that although there may be false jñāna—let us say “cognition”: there are true and false cognition—it is commonly assumed in everyday speech as well as by the Indian epistemologists (with few exceptions, notably, the second-century Buddhist Nāgārjuna and certain followers including Śrīharṣa, the eleventh-century Advaitin) that cognition is ordinarily by nature true or veridical. It is error and falsity that are the deviations from the normal and natural. That is to say, cognition is regarded as knowledge as a kind of conversational default—and so to translate ‘jñāna’ as “knowledge” turns out not to be so bad after all. When the eighth-century Advaitin Śaṅkara says that from the perspective of spiritual knowledge (vidyā) the knowledge we recognize in everyday speech turns out to be illusory, mithyā-jñāna, “false knowledge,” this is supposed to be felt as almost a contradiction in terms (Brahma-sūtra Commentary, preamble).
Now it is argued by practically everyone (save the anti-epistemology group headed by Nāgārjuna) that at least everyday knowledge is proved by our unhesitating action (niṣkampa-prvṛtti) to get what we want and avoid what we want to avoid. We would not so act if we had doubt, guided as we are by our knowledge. Belief, which cognition embeds, is tied to action, and action, in turn, blunts the force of skepticism, it is pointed out in several of the classical schools. Buddhist Yogācāra as well as Mīmāṃsā and (most) Vedānta view knowledge as inherently known to be true. Even Nyāya, a school championing a view of knowledge as unselfconscious of itself as true, subscribes to the epistemological principle of “Innocent until reasonably challenged” (a slight weakening of the “Innocent until proven guilty,” as pointed out, e.g., by Matilal 1986, 314: “Verbal reports … are innocent until proven guilty”). Surprisingly (given the rancor in some exchanges across school), the sixth-century Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara, who is famous for his attacks on Yogācāra positions, takes a similarly charitable attitude to be a rule applying to other philosophies: “For it is a rule with systems (of philosophy) that a position of another that is not expressly disproved is (to be regarded as) in conformity (with one’s own)” (under Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4: 125).
知识是以正确的方式产生的认知。认知是意识的时刻，而不是信仰的种类，但我们可以说，认知形成信仰，形成倾向，而真实的认知形成真正的信念。知识事件 - 以印度的方式说话 - 是以正确的方式产生的认知。这是否是因为它是（如现实主义者，Māmāṃsā，Nyāya，Vaiśeṣika）它实际上有正确的起源，或者是因为它指导成功的行动来帮助我们满足我们的欲望（如Yogācāra理想主义者和实用主义者）知识是以正确的方式产生的认知。有不同的真理理论，但每个人都认为知识不仅仅是说明事实，而且是由它产生的。知识事件形成非现实知识（假设我们可以说），因此，对知识事件的发生至关重要的考察对于认识论的评估至关重要。知识不能偶然发生。一个幸运的猜测虽然是真实的，但不能算作知识，因为它不会以正确的方式产生，不会有正确的血统或病因。整个古典印度认识论的核心概念是“知识来源”，这是一种认知认知过程。
Knowledge is cognition that has been produced in the right way. Cognitions are moments of consciousness, not species of belief, but we may say that cognitions form beliefs in forming dispositions and that veridical cognitions form true beliefs. A knowledge episode—to speak in the Indian manner—is a cognition generated in the right fashion. Whether this be because it is (as say the realists, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika) that it has the right origins in fact, or whether it is because it guides successful action in helping us get our desires satisfied (as say Yogācāra idealists and pragmatists), knowledge is cognition that arises in the right way. There are different theories of truth, but everyone sees knowledge as not only indicating the truth but arising from it. Knowledge episodes form non-occurrent knowledge (it is assumed, we may say), and so an examination of what is crucial to the arising of a knowledge episode is crucial to the evaluations of epistemology. Knowledge cannot arise by accident. A lucky guess, though true or veridical, would not count as knowledge because it would not been generated in the right fashion, would not have the right pedigree or etiology. The central notion throughout classical Indian epistemology is the “knowledge source,” pramāṇa, which is a process of veridical-cognition generation.
现在，通常使用“pramāṇa”（“知识来源”）以及用于个人知识来源，用于感知等的词语，从而暗示了所产生的认知的真实性。这与英语使用背道而驰，以及广泛的哲学假设，与“感知”和公司不同。因为没有知识来源曾经产生错误的信念。瑜伽佛教徒 - 赞同被称为时刻的形而上学观，即现实主义（只有现存的东西才是真实的） - 声称源和结果，知识和效应的过程与普拉姆和普拉姆之间没有区别。因此，在因果关系之间不会有楔形驱动，这样可能会有意外的知识。吠陀学校（Mīmāṃsā，Vedānta，Nyāya，Vaiśeṣika，Sāṃkhya，瑜伽）将知识作为结果和知识生产过程区分开来，但也可以看到所嵌入的概念，如所表明的那样，没有真正的知识来源产生错误的信念。只有伪源。也就是说，没有非真实的认知是知识来源产生的。知识来源不仅仅是可靠的doxastic实践。只是可靠的不符合账单。知识源的概念具有真实的逻辑，如英语中的“知识”; 它是事实。也许我们应该用感知，推论，证明*来呈现古典的印度观念。例如，虚假的证词不算作知识产生者; 梵语用于证词的词语仅用于英文中称为“认知成功的证词”，即，听众有一个讲话者说实话的知识。一个不知不觉的感觉根本就不是一种感觉，而是一种“伪觉”（pratyakṣa-ābhāsa），“明显的感知”，一种感知模仿者。你真的看不到虚幻的蛇 你只会认为你看到一个。
Now the word ‘pramāṇa’ (“knowledge source”) along with the words used for individual knowledge sources, for perception and so on, are commonly used such that the truth of the resultant cognition is implied. This runs counter to English usage, along with broad philosophic supposition, which is different with the words ‘perception’ and company. For no knowledge source ever generates a false belief. Yogācāra Buddhists—who subscribe to the metaphysical view known as momentariness, which is a presentism (only things existing right now are real)—claim that there is no difference between source and result, process of knowledge and effect, pramāṇa and pramā. Thus there can be no wedge driven between cause and effect such that there could possibly be knowledge by accident. The Vedic schools (Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga) do distinguish knowledge as result and knowledge-producing process but also see the concepts as wedded in that, as indicated, no genuine knowledge source ever produces a false belief. Only pseudo-sources do. That is to say, no non-veridical cognition is knowledge-source-generated. A knowledge source is then not merely a reliable doxastic practice. Being merely reliable does not fit the bill. The concept of a knowledge source has a truth logic, like ‘knowledge’ in English; it is factive. Maybe we should say perception, inference, testimony* to render the classical Indian ideas. False testimony, for example, does not count as a knowledge-generator; the Sanskrit word for testimony is used only for what would be termed in English “epistemically successful testimony,” i.e., with a hearer having knowledge in virtue of a speaker telling the truth. A non-veridical perception is not really a perception at all but a “pseudo-perception” (pratyakṣa-ābhāsa), “apparent perception,” a perception imitator. You don’t really see an illusory snake; you only think you see one.
1.2 The Touchstone of Everyday Speech
每天的言语模式（vyavahāra）被视为理论认识论与其他哲学领域理论的起点。那么，例如，感知和推理 - 更具有异国情调的候选来源也被人们普遍认为是这样认为的，被视为真正的知识产生者。人们在理由问题上引用了信仰的血统。请注意，即使在英语中，我们也常常认同感知知识，其他一些则是认证。因此，这似乎是一种常见的人类实践，而不仅限于古典的印度文明，有时我们说，例如，“S确实在那里，因为我看到他”，“你不能真正感觉到S因为条件Y不持有“（”你看不到任何人离这个距离“）。演讲习惯通过成功的行动得到加强，古典理论家承认接受普遍意见的推定权力。但是，作为一个知识来源，“知识来源”可能被认为是一个技术术语，就像我们已经看到的一样，就是定义上的事实。同样的理由（prāmāṇya），如果有明示（或客观），而不是明显的（ābhāsa），那么有理由认为是正确的。
Everyday patterns of speech (vyavahāra) are taken as a starting point for theorizing in epistemology as in other areas of philosophy. So, for example, perception and inference—more exotic candidate sources, too—are defended as veritable knowledge-generators by the observation that people commonly regard them in that way. People cite a belief’s pedigree in questions of justification. Note that even in English we do commonly recognize perception and some of the others as certificational. Thus this seems to be a common human practice, not restricted to classical Indian civilization, for sometimes we say, for instance, “S is indeed over there, since I see him,” and “You couldn’t really have perceived S because condition Y does not hold” (“You can’t see anyone from this distance”). Habits of speech are reinforced by success in action, classical theorists recognize in accepting the presumptive authority of common opinion. But “a knowledge source” may be thought of as a technical term, one that entails factivity, as we have seen, as a matter of definition. Similarly with justification (prāmāṇya), the having of which, if veritable (or objective), as opposed to the apparent (ābhāsa), means that the justified cognition is true.
1.3 Knowledge and World-Transcendence
There is much controversy over the religious goal of life among the several schools, both among schools accepting Vedic culture (liberation vs. heaven, individual dissolution into the Absolute Brahman, blissful yogic “isolation,” kaivalya, enjoyment of God’s presence) and among outsider schools (Buddhist nirvāṇa or becoming a bodhi-sattva or a Jaina arhat as well as Cārvāka’s entire rejection of soteriology). But from a distance, we can see common conceptions linking at least many of the Indian views. One is to draw a distinction between everyday and spiritual knowledge and to theorize about their relationship. A prominent position is that thinking about the world is an obstacle to spiritual enlightenment. Another is that proper understanding of the world helps one disengage and to know oneself as separate from material things, and so is an aid to transcendence. The most distinctive form of skepticism in classical Indian thought is that so-called worldly knowledge is not knowledge at all but is a perversion or deformation of consciousness. Who seems a philosophical skeptic is really a saint helping us achieve our truly greatest good of world-transcendence by helping us see the paradoxes and other failures of theory.
With an eye to the alleged power of inference to prove the existence of God or personal survival, the Cārvāka materialist school recognizes perception as a knowledge source but not inference nor any other candidate. Inference depends upon generalizations which outstrip perceptual evidence, everything F as a G. No one can know that, Cārvāka claims. Testimony is also no good since it presupposes that any speaker would tell the truth and thus is subject to the same criticism of lack of evidence. And so on through the other candidates (Mādhava, Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha). The standard response is pragmatic. We could not act as we do if we could not rely on inference (etc.) albeit inference does depend on generalization that (often, not invariably) outstrips experience. The skeptic himself relies on such generalizations when he opens his mouth to voice his skepticism, by using words with repeatable meanings (Gaṅgeśa, inference chapter, Tattva-cintā-maṇi).
The Cārvāka argument identifying the problem of induction is turned by both Buddhist and Nyāya philosophers into an argument for fallibilism about inference. What we take to be the result of a genuine inference may turn out to hinge on a fallacy, a hetv-ābhāsa, an apparent but misleading “reason” or sign (see the section below on inference). But to accept that sometimes we reason in ways that mimic but fail to instantiate right forms is not to be a skeptic. Indeed, the very concept of a fallacy (hetv-ābhāsa) presupposes that of the veritable reason or sign (hetu), a veritable prover making us have new knowledge.
A different kind of skepticism is broader in scope, not restricted to inference or other candidate sources. It appears both in Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta, but let us rehearse only the Buddhist version. By discerning absurdities that arise in viewing anything as having an independent existence, one realizes, as Nāgārjuna says, that everything is niḥsvabhāva, “without a reality of its own.” Applying this to oneself, one comes to see the truth of the Buddha’s teaching of anātman, “no-self,” which is viewed as a decisive step toward the summum bonum of enlightenment and perfection (prajñā-pāramitā). In particular, Nāgārjuna identifies a problem of a justification regress in the pramāṇa program (Vigraha-vyavārtinī, v. 33), which assumes that process and result can be separated, along with various conundra or paradoxes concerning relations (such as the so-called Bradley problem). The Nyāya-sūtra argues that the Nāgārjunian type of skepticism is self-defeating (4.2.26-36), but many of the problems identified by the Buddhist (and his intellectual inheritors such as Śrīharṣa) occupy the reflections of philosophers for centuries, Buddhist as well as Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā among Vedic schools in particular.
- Knowing That You Know
One of the philosophic problems that Nāgārjuna raised for epistemology has to do with an alleged regress of justification on the assumption that a pramāṇa is required in order to know and that to identify the source of a bit of knowledge is to certify the proposition embedded. Nāgārjuna claims that this is absurd in that it would require an infinite series of pramāṇa, of identification of a more fundamental pramāṇa for every pramāṇa relied on.
Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta philosophers argue that such a threat of regress shows that knowledge is self-certifying, svataḥ prāmāṇya. Vedāntins connect the Upanishadic teaching of a truest or deepest self (ātman) as having “self-illumining awareness” (sva-prakāśa) with a Mīmāṃsā epistemological theory of self-certification: at least in the case of spiritual knowledge (vidyā) awareness is self-aware. From this it follows that only awareness is right concerning all questions about awareness, since only awareness itself has, so to say, access to itself. Awareness itself is the only consideration relevant to any question about awareness itself, its existence or its nature.
Mīmāṃsā defends Vedic truth by claiming that knowledge of it wears its certification on its sleeve like everyday knowledge where the initial credibility of an occurrent cognition seems practically absolute. According to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā (from the late seventh century), no cognition that in itself purports to be veridical is indeed non-veridical; no cognition is absolutely wrong but at worst a confusion. The same causal nexus that produces a veridical cognition produces knowledge of its veridicality. According to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā (deriving from Kumārila, Prabhākara’s teacher), veridicality is known through the process of inference whereby a cognition itself would be known as having occurred. A cognition, which is an act, produces a feature in the object it cognizes, a “cognizedness,” and then from apprehension of this feature both the original cognition and its veridicality are known. Certification is thus intrinsic to a cognition’s being known, that is, with cognitions that are veridical. With respect to knowledge of non-veridicality, extrinsic certification is necessary.
Nyayya认为认证（parataḥprāmāṇya）的外在观点 - 否认Kp需要KKp; 知道你知道需要接受认证 - 所以看起来很容易受到回归的收费。解决方案涉及到“意识”（anuvyavasāya）的概念，这是一种二级认知，其另一种认知作为其对象，而不是自我意识。在心理上考虑的认证涉及到认知，认为有挑战的目标认知是虚假的或真实的。
Nyāya takes an extrinsicality view of certification (parataḥ prāmāṇya)—it denies that Kp entails KKp; to know that you know requires apperceptive certification—and so seems vulnerable to the regress charge. The solution involves the notion of “apperception” (anuvyavasāya), which is a second-level cognition that has another cognition as its object without itself being self-aware. Certification, psychologically considered, involves apperception, a seeing that a challenged, target cognition is false or true.
Vātsyāyana (fourth century, whose Nyāya-sūtra commentary is the oldest extant) expressly rebuts the regress charge (we do sometimes certify our claims without having to certify the certifiers) under Nyāya-sūtra 2.1.20 (448-49, translation mine):
If comprehension of perception or another (knowledge source) landed us in infinite regress, then everyday action and discourse would not go on through comprehension of self-consciously known objects and their known causes. (However) everyday action and discourse do proceed for someone comprehending self-consciously known objects and their known causes: when (self-consciously) I grasp by perception an object or I grasp one by inference or I grasp one by analogy or I grasp one by tradition or testimony (the four knowledge sources according to Nyāya), the (apperceptive) cognition that occurs goes like this: “My knowledge is perceptual” or “My knowledge is inferential” or “My knowledge is from analogy” or “My knowledge is testimonial.”
And motivation to seek righteousness (dharma), wealth, pleasure, or liberation proceeds through these comprehensions (whereas if there is doubt, no such goal-directed activity would occur), as likewise motivation to reject their opposites. Everyday discourse and action would cease (to be possible for such a subject) if what is alleged were indeed to hold (justificational regress).
Nyāya’s strategy is then (1) to charge the objector with making a “pragmatic contradiction,” (2) to take veridicality as cognitive default, and (3) to certify cognitions by source identification as well as by inference from the success or failure of the activity that they provoke and guide. We assume without checking that our cognition is veridical, but sometimes we need to check. Note that the practical pursuits that Vātsyāyana mentions as guided by second-order, reflective knowledge are: “righteousness (dharma), wealth, pleasure, [and] liberation.”
All the classical schools that advance epistemologies accept perception as a knowledge source although there is much disagreement about its nature, objects, and limitations. Are the objects of perception internal to consciousness or external? Are they restricted to individuals, e.g., a particular cow, or are universals, e.g., cowhood, also perceived? How about relations? Absences or negative facts (Devadatta’s not being at home)? Parts or wholes? Both? A self, awareness itself? There are issues about perceptual media such as light and ether, ākāśa, the purported medium of sound, and about what is perceptible yogically (God, the īśvara, the ātman or self, puruṣa). What are the environmental conditions that govern perception, and how do these connect with the different sensory modalities? Are there internal conditions on perception (such as attention or focus, viewed by some as a voluntary act)? Is a recognition, e.g., “This is that Devadatta I saw yesterday,” perceptual? And does it prove the endurance of things over time including the perceiving subject? Do we perceive only fleeting qualities (dharma), as Buddhists tend to say, or qualifiers as qualifying qualificanda (a lotus as qualified by being-blue), as say realist Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā? Does all perception involve a sensory connection with an object that is responsible for providing its content or intentionality (nirākāra-vāda, Nyāya), or is the content of perception internal to itself (sākāra-vāda, Yogācāra)? How do we differentiate veritable perception, which is defined as veridical, and pseudo-perception (illusion), which is non-veridical? How is illusion to be explained? These are some of the outstanding issues and questions that occupy the schools in all periods of their literatures.
Yogācāra主观主义将观念视为“无概念”，而第三世纪的整体语法学家Bhartṛhari认为这一切都是用语言穿着的。Mīmāṃsā和Nyayya现实主义者强调至少对于含有基本感官谓词的观察语句的认识论基础的认知类型的“概念载体”性质。可以肯定的是，Mīmāṃsā和后来的Nyayya也承认了无概念的看法。KumārilaBhaṭṭa提到对一个婴儿的认知是一个例子（Śloka-vārttika对Mīmāṃsā-sūtra的看法的评注，112节，第94页;另见Matilal 1986,321-322）。考虑到这种类型的感知，现象学中的人类似乎与婴儿和动物有很多共同之处。但是根据伟大的Mīmāṃsaka，感觉并没有太多地分成类型，而是形成一个以概念为第一阶段的过程。意识到对象在第一时刻只是准命题，而第二个内容则被填写成为确定个人具有某种特性，成为某种物质或具有普遍性的手段或动作等（第120节，第96页）。感觉到的对象，莲花（或任何），在第一阶段被认为是个人整体，无论是在个性上还是具有一个特征。但是，这个人物，事物是蓝色的，而不是红色，现在在这里，在没有内部提供的概念的调解的情况下是不知道的。看到最终是“看得见”，并且“用言语开枪”，用Bhartṛhari（Vākyapadīya，ch。1，第123-124页，p。199; 另见Matilal 1986,342）。然而，根据现实主义者，思想或自我不会有任何先天的想法（不同于那个假定集体的“仓库意识”ālaya-vijñāna的Yogācrara）。概念是以往经验的记录。
Yogācāra subjectivism views perception as “concept-free,” whereas the holist grammarian Bhartṛhari of the third century finds it all to be clothed in language. Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya realists emphasize the “concept-laden” nature of at least the type of perception that is epistemically foundational for observation statements containing basic sensory predicates. To be sure, Mīmāṃsā and later Nyāya also admit concept-free perception. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa mentions the cognition of an infant as an example (Śloka-vārttika commentary on the perception sūtra of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, verse 112, p. 94; see also Matilal 1986, 321–322). Phenomenologically humans would seem to have much in common with infants and animals considering this type of perception. But according to the great Mīmāṃsaka, perception does not so much divide into types as form a process with the concept-free as the first stage. Awareness of the object is only quasi-propositional in the first moment, and at the second has its content filled out to become the means whereby an individual is ascertained to have a certain character, to be a certain kind of substance or to possess a universal or an action, etc. (verse 120, p. 96). The object perceived, the lotus (or whatever), is known in the first stage as an individual whole, both in its individuality and as having a character. But the character, the thing’s being blue as opposed to red, and its being here right now, are not known without the mediation of concepts which are supplied internally. Seeing is ultimately “seeing as” and is “shot through with words,” to use the expression of Bhartṛhari (Vākyapadīya, ch. 1, verses 123–124, p. 199; see also Matilal 1986, 342). However, the mind or self does not, according to the realists, have any innate ideas (unlike then Yogācāra, which postulates a collective “storehouse consciousness,” ālaya-vijñāna). Concepts are the records of previous experiences.
Yogācāra holds that all predication, including the sensory, depends on ideas of unreal generality. All predication involves repeatable general terms. Thus the realists’ “propositional content” is suspicious just because this is not raw perception which alone is capable of presenting the truly real, the sva-lakṣaṇa, “that which is its own mark,” the unique or particular. Classical Indian realists hold that perception is none the worse for being concept-laden in that concepts are features of the world as impressed upon the mind or self. Perception founds true beliefs, and the repeatable predicates and concepts (cowhood) perceptually acquired and re-presented and employed in verbalizations pick out constituents of real objects, things that do re-occur (there are lots of cows in the world). For late Nyāya philosophers, concept-laden perception comes so to dwarf in importance the indeterminate, concept-free variety that the latter becomes problematic. Perception in its epistemological role is concept-laden. Otherwise, it could not be certificational. Perception as a knowledge source is a doxastic, belief-generating process. Beliefs (or anyhow perceptual cognitions and their verbalizations) are dependent on concepts (to believe or say that there is a pot on the floor, one must possess the concepts of “pot” and “floor”).
Yogācāra佛教徒对他们的主观主义的最好的论证 - 一个嫌疑犯从根本上来源于对可能性普遍的nirvāaa经验的承诺，尽管这不是说 - 是感性幻觉。幻觉证明，感知的对象不是世界的一个特征，而是从主题的角度出发。绳索可以被认为是一条蛇，从感知者的角度来看，在幻觉和一种真实的蛇感觉之间没有区别。同样，梦想是梦想家的“看法”，但不触摸现实。（我们的世界是一个梦想，说佛教徒，我们应该尝试成为佛，“觉醒”）
The Yogācāra Buddhists’ best argument for their subjectivism—which one suspects derives more fundamentally from a commitment to the possibility of a universal nirvāṇa experience, although this is not said—is perceptual illusion. Illusion proves that a perception’s object is not a feature of the world but is contributed somehow from the side of the subject. A rope can be perceived as a snake, with no difference, from the perspective of the perceiver, between the illusion and a veridical snake perception. Similarly, dreams are the “perceptions” of a dreamer but do not touch reality. (Our world is a dream, say Buddhists, and we should try to become buddha, “Awakened.”)
抵制幻觉论证的一种方法属于PrābhākaraMīmāṃsā，它坚持认为，不仅是知觉总是具有实质性的，而且是一般的认知。奈亚哲学家相反，幻觉是一种虚假的认知。富贵的辩论发生在Nyayya的“错位”的幻觉和Prābhākara“幻觉”或“遗漏”理论的观点（幻觉是不认识某种，没有认知，例如，缺乏认知的在握着一块贝壳S的声音中，银的记忆与珍珠之母之间的区别在于“银！”）。这里Nyayya同意主观主义者：有时一个人S显然认为a是F-有一个明显的知觉认知嵌入Fa - 当一个不是事实上F，而S不能从她自己的第一人称角度来辨认认知是非真实的。然而，根据Nyayya以及Mīmāṃsā的预测内容，F-hood的介绍或指示，通过F-hood的以前的真实经验，起源于“真正的F”。
One way to resist the pull of the illusion argument belongs to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā which insists that not only is perception invariably veridical but also cognition in general, jñāna. Nyāya philosophers hold in contrast that illusion is a false cognition. Rich debate occurs over Nyāya’s “misplacement” view of illusion and a Prābhākara “no-illusion” or “omission” theory (illusion is a failure to cognize of a certain sort, an absence of cognition, for example, an absence of cognition of the difference between a remembering of silver and a perceiving of mother-of-pearl when holding in hand a piece of shell S exclaims, “Silver!”). Here Nyāya agrees with the subjectivists: sometimes a person S apparently perceives a to be F—has an apparently perceptual cognition embedding Fa—when a is not in fact F, while S cannot discern from her own first-person perspective that the cognition is non-veridical. Nevertheless, the predication content, according to Nyāya as also Mīmāṃsā, the presentation or indication of F-hood, originates in things’ really being F, through previous veridical experience of F-hood.
这里我们触及古典印度现实主义的心脏。Snakehood可以通过以前的蛇的经验来成为虚幻的预测内容。通过引发由以前的经验形成的蛇形记忆处置（saṃskāra），它通过正常因果过程中的一个结果融入当前的感觉。幻觉的内容或意图（viṣayatā，“客观性”）就是由真实的特征产生的，因为它们是真实的感知，尽管它们是不同的认知类型。幻觉涉及到记忆中保留的预测内容的当前（确定）认知（这将是伪感知）的投射。有时，保存在记忆中的元素的融合是跨感觉的，品尝酸味，例如，当通过视觉感知柠檬或嗅到一段檀香木时，这些檀香木被认为是远离实际的嗅觉刺激。这些是具有明显的混合或记忆色彩的真实感知的情况。根据Nyayya的说法，需要进行类似的分析，但不同于虚构的投射幻觉案例涉及采取某些事情是不正确的，通过“错放”的限定词来看待或察觉它。这意味着概念负载的观念必然是组合的 - 这个立场是由Gautama自己所采取的立场，即“制造者”，由Vātsyāyana和其他评论家在文本中明确地针对早期形式的佛教主观主义（Nyayya-sūtra4.2 .26-36）。这些谣言的结果是，首先，幻觉的概念是寄生于真实的经验（不是所有的硬币都可以是假的），第二，这种错觉显示了组合（命题）的结构：这是一种或另一种。据Nyāya认为，知觉错觉是正确的，那里有东西，但是它是什么错了。
Here we touch the heart of classical Indian realism. Snakehood is available to become illusory predication content through previous veridical experience of snakes. It gets fused into a current perception by means of a foul-up in the normal causal process through the arousing of a snakehood memory-disposition (saṃskāra) formed by previous experience. The content or intentionality (viṣayatā, “objecthood”) of an illusion is to be explained causally as generated by real features of real things just as is genuine perception though they are distinct cognitive types. Illusion involves the projection into current (determinate) cognition (which would be pseudo-perception) of predication content preserved in memory. Sometimes the fusion of an element preserved in memory is cross-sensory, tasting sourness, for instance, when perceiving a lemon by sight or smelling a piece of sandalwood which is seen at too far a distance for actual olfactory stimulation. These are cases of veridical perception with an obvious admixture or tinge of memory. Illusion, according to Nyāya, is to be analyzed similarly, but unlike veridical cases of projection illusion involves taking something to be what it is not, a seeing or perceiving it through a “misplaced” qualifier. This means that concept-laden perception is necessarily combinational—a position taken by Gautama himself, the “sūtra-maker,” and much elaborated by Vātsyāyana and the other commentators in text apparently aimed at an early form of Buddhist subjectivism (Nyāya-sūtra 4.2.26-36). The upshot of these sūtras is that, first, the concept of illusion is parasitic on that of veridical experience (not all coins can be counterfeit), and, second, that illusion shows a combinational (propositional) structure: this is a something or other. According to Nyāya, perceptual illusion is right in part, that there is something there, but wrong about what it is.
To fill out the realist account in late Nyāya, thought-laden perception, determinate perception, gets its content not only from the object in connection with the sense organ but also from the classificational power of the mind (or self). With the perceptual cognition, “That’s a pot,” for instance, the pot as an individual in connection with a sensory faculty is responsible for the awareness of a property-bearer, for what is called the qualificandum portion of the perception, without admixture of memory. But the sensory connection is not by itself responsible for the qualifier portion, the pothood, that is to say, the thing’s classification as a pot. A qualificandum as qualified by a qualifier is perceived all at once (eka-vṛtti-vedya), but a determinate perception’s portions have distinct etiologies. Now the classificational power of the mind (or self) is not innate, as pointed out, but is rather the product of presentational experience (anubhava) over the course of a subject’s life. Repeatable features of reality get impressed on the mind (or self) in the form of memory dispositions. For most adults, prior determinate cognition is partly responsible for the content predicable of a particular, or a group of things, presented through the senses. That is, in perceiving a as an F, an F-saṃskāra formed by previous knowledge-source-produced bits of occurrent cognition of things F would be a causal factor. The perception’s own content includes the repeatable nature of the qualifier through the operation of this factor. We see the tree as a tree.
但是，有时既不是先前的确定性认知也不是记忆性配置对于预测内容负责，例如，当孩子第一次看到母牛时。相反，“在原始”中对限定词（牛仔）的感性掌握将其带入随之而来的概念 - 负担和言语表达的观念。换句话说，有一些确定的认知，其中不确定的，无概念的感知独立地提供限定词，随后的概念 - 负载的感知不被记忆所困扰。根据Nyāya和Mīmāṃsā以及所有旗帜的认识论者，通常，saṃskāra，“记忆处置”确实在决定性的认知中起因果作用。但有时候，一个先前无概念的限定词的看法会起到萨斯卡拉的作用，它本身就是提供概念，
But sometimes neither a prior determinate cognition nor a memory disposition is at all responsible for the predication content, for example, when a child sees a cow for the very first time. Rather, an “in the raw” perceptual grasping of the qualifier (cowhood) delivers it to an ensuing concept-laden and verbalizable perception. In other words, there are cases of determinate cognition where indeterminate, concept-free perception furnishes the qualifier independently and the ensuing concept-laden perception is not tinged by memory. Normally, saṃskāra, “memory-dispositions,” do play a causal role in determinate perception, according to Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā and indeed epistemologists of all flags. But sometimes an immediately prior concept-free perception of a qualifier plays the role of the saṃskāra, furnishing by itself the concept, the predication content, the qualifier portion of an ensuing determinate, proposition-laden perception, which is the type of cognition that founds our beliefs about the world.
If this were not an “immaculate perception” but itself a grasping of a property through the grasping of another property, we would be faced with an infinite regress and direct perception of the world would be impossible. Concept-free perception need not provide the classifying not only with second and third-time perceptions of something as F but not even, strictly speaking, with a first-time perception, since there could be an intervening cognitive factor (provided, say, by analogy: see below). But with that factor again the question would arise how it gets its content, and so since an indeterminate perception has to be posited at some point to block a regress it might as well be at the start. This is the main argument of Gaṅgeśa, the late Nyāya systematizer, in defense of positing the concept-free as a type or first stage of perception (Phillips 2001).
Nevertheless, for all intents and purposes, perception embodies beliefs, according to the realists. More accurately, a perceptual belief is the result of the operation of perception as a knowledge source. Everything that is nameable is knowable and vice-versa. There is nothing that when we attend to it cannot bear a name, for we can make up new names. We can in principle verbalize the indications of our experience, though many of them are not named since we are indifferent (pebbles perceived along the road). Concept-free perception is the classical Indian realist rendering of our ability to form perceptual concepts by attending to perception’s phenomenological side. Epistemologically, it plays no role, since it is itself a posit and is unverbalizable and not directly apperceived (A. Chakrabarti 2000 gives this and other reasons for jettisoning the concept from Nyāya’s own realist point of view).
As mentioned, Yogācāra takes issue with the realist theory of perception, viewing all perception as concept-free. What is perceived is only the unqualified particular, sva-lakṣaṇa. The realists’ “qualifiers” such as cowhood are mental constructions, “convenient fictions.” Various reductio arguments are put forth to show the incoherence of the realists’ conception of a qualificandum perceived at once to be qualified by a qualifier (eka-vṛtti-vedya). The different views of the objects of perception feed different views of inference.
Logic is developed in classical India within the traditions of epistemology. Inference is a second knowledge source, a means whereby we can know things not immediately evident through perception. Oetke (2004) finds three roots to the earliest concerns with logic in India: (1) common-sense inference, (2) establishment of doctrines in the frame of scientific treatises (śāstra), and (3) justification of tenets in a debate. The three of these come together (though the latter two are predominant) within the epistemological traditions in an almost universal regard of inference as a knowledge source.
Seeing classical Indian logic as part of epistemology, as explaining how we know facts through the mediation of our knowledge of other facts, makes it easy to understand why both the Buddhist and Vedic schools count a valid but unsound argument as fallacious: no knowledge is generated. Classical Indian philosophers are not focused on logic per se, but rather on a psychological process whereby we come to know things indirectly, by way of a sign, hetu or liṅga, an indication of something currently beyond the range of the senses, whether at a distance spatially or temporally or of a sort (such as atoms or God or the Buddha mind) that by nature cannot be directly perceived.
古典印度逻辑的两个最伟大的名字属于佛教Yogācrara学校，Dignāga（第六世纪）和Dharmakīrti（七世纪初）的逻辑学家。Dignāga列出了所有可能的包容和排斥关系，扩展了两个术语，称为证明者或“标志”，hetu和先例，sādhya，“被证明”的财产。因此，他揭示了pramāṇa的基础根据Yogācāra本体论，这是唯一的命运的细节集合的推论。Dharmakīrti根据基于所有推理作为知识来源的类 - 包含关系的本体论性质进行分类推理。早期的哲学家佛教徒和非佛教徒都提供了日常推理的例子，其中有几个是在性质上有所减退的，非正式的推理是最好的解释，例如，Vātsyāyana在他对Nyayya-sūtra的推论sūtra（1.1.5）的评论中说，从一个膨胀的河流的视线，得出结论，它已经下降了上游。但是，还有一些推论，包括演绎，外推，有时恰当地归纳于日常生活主题的理论，以及许多学校的许多前Dignāga文本中的哲学。有时候，有人声称，没有一个人在Dignāga之前有一个推理 - 推理的概念，“vyāpti”是一个被证明是财产的证明者财产的概念。然而，Dignāga可以获得最早的系统化的功劳，它使用三个术语，一个建议推理的网站或主题（pakṣa，山上的一个推测的山峰中的山脉上的山脉知道火山知识），
The two greatest names for classical Indian logic belong to logicians of the Buddhist Yogācāra school, Dignāga (sixth century) and Dharmakīrti (early seventh century). Dignāga laid out all the possible relationships of inclusion and exclusion for the extensions of two terms called the prover or “sign,” hetu, and the probandum, sādhya, the property “to be proved.” Thereby he revealed the underpinnings of the pramāṇa of inference in terms of sets of particulars, which, according to Yogācāra ontology, are the only reals. Dharmakīrti classified inferences based on the ontological nature of the class-inclusion relationship that underpins all inference as a knowledge source. Earlier philosophers, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, provide examples of everyday reasoning, several of which are abductive in character, informal reasoning to the best explanation, from sight of a swollen river, for example, says Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the inference sūtra (1.1.5) of the Nyāya-sūtra, to the conclusion that it has rained upstream. But there are also instances of inferences comprised of deductive, extrapolative, and sometimes properly inductive reasoning on topics of everyday life as well as philosophy in numerous pre-Dignāga texts of several schools. It is not true, as is sometimes claimed, that no one before Dignāga had the notion of an inference-underpinning “pervasion,” vyāpti, of a prover property by a property to be proved. Dignāga does however get the credit for the earliest systematization, which employs three terms, a site or subject of a proposed inference (pakṣa, the mountain in the stock example of an inference from sight of smoke on a mountain to knowledge of fire on the mountain), the prover or prover property (hetu, smokiness), and the probandum (sādhya, fieriness).
Dignāga, it should be stressed, as a nominalist sees inference as proceeding from knowledge of particulars to other knowledge of particulars (avoiding the universals of the realists, as nicely explained by Hayes 1988 with reference to the Buddhist apoha, “exclusion,” theory of concepts). Dignāga formulates a threefold test for a good prover, trairūpya-hetu:
the prover’s occurrence in the site of a proposed inference must be known to the subject S
- the prover’s occurrence at least once together with the probandum must be known to S
- no counter-case of a prover occurring without the probandum must be known to S.
Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-sūtra commentary incorporates Dignāga’s ideas to formalize many of Vātsyāyana’s informal inferences. The Nyāya philosopher owes almost everything to his Buddhist adversaries, as opposed to his Nyāya predecessors, but he does criticize and alter what he sees as the certification conditions of inference as a knowledge source, combining Dignāga’s second and third tests into a single requirement, knowledge of pervasion. He also adds a third condition, the subject’s having to “reflect” and put the information together, so to say:
pakṣa-dharmatā: the prover has to be known to S as qualifying the inferential subject or site
- vyāpti-smaraṇa: the prover’s being pervaded by the probandum has to be remembered by S
- liṅga-parāmarśa: S must connect by reflection the pervasion with the inferential site.
The upshot of the addition may be interpreted as the recognition that knowledge is not closed under deduction considered in abstraction from the psychological process of “reflection.” But through that process, epistemic warrant—or “certainty,” niścaya—passes from premises to conclusion, and we act unhesitatingly, for example, to put a fire on yonder mountain out.
Things are yet more complicated. Inferential knowledge is defeasible, or, more precisely stated, what a subject takes to be inferential knowledge may turn out to be pseudo, non-genuine, a false cognition imitating a true one, or even in Gettier-style cases an accidentally true cognition masquerading as one genuinely inference-born. Knowledge has a social dimension. Not only would awareness of a counterexample be a defeater, but also if someone were to present a counterinference to a conclusion opposed to ours, no longer would we have inferential knowledge. Awareness of any of several kinds of “blocker” of “reflection” can undermine the generalization on which such reflection depends. There are potential preventers of inferential awareness, “defeaters,” bādhaka, leading to belief relinquishment by someone who has hitherto not noticed a counterexample or the like and who has thus drawn a conclusion erroneously.
However, one should not think that the epistemologists’ inference is non-monotonic, as established by Taber (2004) against Oetke (1996) in particular. The paradigm logical form embedded in a good inference is monotonic. New information is irrelevant to the validity of the pattern itself, although it may well be relevant to a subject’s justification for acceptance of the premises. Examples of inferences in classical texts often seem non-monotonic because fallibility attaches to the premises. Such fallibility of course passes to the conclusion, too. (Cf. Israel 1980 who similarly voices an epistemological complaint against the very idea of non-monotonic logic, according to Koons 2013.)
Targeting the relationship of pervasion in Uddyotakara’s second condition, vyāpti-smaraṇa, which appears to be the ontological underpinning of Dignāga’s conditions (2) and (3), Dharmakīrti divides inferences into three kinds:
sva-bhāva (self-nature: “It’s a tree because it’s a śiṃśapā oak”)
- tad-utpatti (causality: “Fire is there because smoke is there”)
- anupalabdhi (non-perception: “There is no pot here because none is perceived”).
Yogācāra认为，第一种推理是基础的渗透是“内在的”（antar-vyāpti）。我们可以认为这是概念之间的内在关系，因此与西方哲学的先验相似。但实际上这是一个技术性的观点，即将选择主题或主题的术语 - 作为一个集合的想法 - 将其纳入归纳归纳基础（或外推，根据Ganeri 2001b）这让我们知道一个普遍的关系。Mīmāṃsā和Nyayya排除这种推论是乞求这个问题：我们想知道推理主体是否具有先发制人的财产，所以引用这个主题本身，甚至是一部分，违背了推理的目的。
Yogācāra holds that with the first type of inference the underpinning pervasion is “internal” (antar-vyāpti). We may think of this as an internal relation between concepts and thus as similar to the a priori of Western philosophy. But it is actually a technical point about whether the term that picks out the inferential subject or subjects—think of the pakṣa as a set—closes it off from being included in the inductive base of the generalization (or extrapolation, according to Ganeri 2001b) that gives us knowledge of a pervasion relationship. Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya rule out this kind of inference as begging the question: we want to know whether the inferential subject possesses the probandum property and so to cite that subject itself, even a part of it, runs counter to the very purpose of inference.
Later Nyāya divides inferences not according to the ontology of pervasion (which is mapped onto the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology and causal theory, sometimes not very successfully) but rather by the way a pervasion is known:
anvaya-vyatireka (“positive and negative”): inferences based on positive and negative correlations where both are available, i.e., cases where, for example, smokiness and fieriness have been known to occur together, kitchen hearths, campfires, etc., like (it is claimed) yonder smoky mountain where being-fiery is to be proved, taken along with negative examples where the prover as well as the probandum is known not to occur
- kevala-anvaya (“positive only”): inferences based on positive correlations only, where there are no known examples of an absence of the probandum property, such as would have to be the case with the universally present property, knowability (there is nothing that is not knowable)
- kevala-vyatireka (“negative only”): inferences based on negative correlations only where outside of the subject or site there are no known cases of the probandum.
Many of the inferences that Buddhists identify as hinging on an “internal pervasion” (antar-vyāpti) Nyāya philosophers see as “negative only” (kevala-vyatireka). Taking a particular śiṃśapā oak as the pakṣa, we have the negative correlation proving it is a tree: whatever is not a tree, is not a śiṃśapā oak, for example, a lotus.
Western interpretations and representations of inference as classically conceived have often missed its unity as a knowledge source. Ganeri (2001b: 20) claims that it is better to understand both the Buddhist and early Nyāya patterns as “not enthymematic,” not skipping a step of generalization and then implicitly using universal instantiation (UI) and modus ponens (MP) in applying the rule to a case at hand. Case-based reasoning need not be interpreted as relying on universal quantifiers, and the representation of Schayer (1933) and others which uses them is misleading. Theirs is indeed misleading, and Ganeri appears to be right with regard to the early theories. But with late Nyāya Schayer’s argument form of UI and MP misleads for yet another reason, namely, failing to be sufficiently sensitive to the logic of occurrence and non-occurrence of properties at a location, or qualifying a property-bearer, as Staal (1973) and others have brought out. Furthermore, Ganeri is right that in analyzing the pattern one tends to miss the unity of the causal theory that has one mental state brought about by another. In the Nyāya theory, everything is integrated in the notion of “reflection,” parāmarśa, as an inference’s proximate instrumental cause or “trigger,” karaṇa. While not the only necessary condition, this one is the last in place, securing the occurrence of inferential knowledge.
Following Matilal (1998), we can reconstruct such “reflection” as a singular inference:
(K)(SpHa) → (K)Sa
This says that on the condition that a subject knows that H-as-qualified-by-being-pervaded-by-S qualifies a, then the subject knows that Sa. The arrow should be interpreted as depicting causal sufficiency, in line with Uddyotakara and the later tradition. “Reflection” is a complex mental state that is nevertheless a unity, both as a particular cognition that can be a causal factor for the rise of another cognition and as having content, or “objecthood,” expressible in a single sentence. Attempts to find a single rule are in consonance with both of these dimensions of the theory. But a lot of inductive depth is packed into the idea of a pervasion being known, and a lot about it is said that shows that there is generalization, at least in the later Nyāya theory. Knowing a general rule is considered crucial, not just extrapolation to a next case. From Uddyotakara on, Nyāya philosophers treat pervasion as the equivalent of a rule stating that—to use the language of sets and terms—the extension of the probandum term includes that of the prover term, includes it entirely such that there is nothing that locates the pervaded property (the prover) that does not also locate the pervader (the probandum), as argued by Kisor Chakrabarti (1995) among others.
The centralmost issue with inference, to consider the effort of late Nyāya philosophers, is to make plain the logic of pervasion as well as how we know the universalized items, or entire extensions, of the terms figuring in our knowledge of such rules, the items that underpin our knowledge of such inclusions, such naturally necessary pervasions of a prover by a probandum property. Lots of work from the earliest focuses on fallacies and inference in the context of formal debate. And there are many philosophical inferences advanced in the literatures of the various schools, such as proofs of momentariness, the existence of God, the possibility of liberation from birth and rebirth, and dozens more.
Vaiśeṣika among the Vedic schools along with Buddhists who of course impugn the “testimony” of the Veda reject testimony as an independent knowledge source, pramāṇa. Buddhists claim that their religious teachings are founded on nothing other than reasoning and experience, albeit mystical experience, the nirvāṇa experience that makes a Buddha an expert about spiritual matters. As with memory, whose correctness is dependent on the veridicality or non-veridicality of the cognition that forms the saṃskāra memory-impression, the veridicality of testimony depends on the knowledge of the testifier (or of an original testifier in a chain of testimony) whose source has to be other than testimony, namely, perception or inference. Vaiśeṣika and Yogācāra join together in seeing a hearer H’s knowledge that p which other philosophers see as flowing from testimony as really resulting from an inference having as one premise that the speaker S is trustworthy and as another that S has said p, to conclude that p is true. Nyāya resists such as inferentialist account from the earliest, in the sūtras of Gautama, claiming that the inferentialist conflates inferential certification of the truth of p with testimonial knowledge that p at a first or unreflective level (as nicely explained by Mohanty 1994). Vātsyāyana and others argue (under Nyāya-sūtra 2.1.52) that the certification conditions are different for the two knowledge sources. The eighth-century Jayanta Bhaṭṭa writes (Nyāya-mañjarī 322): “The conditions that determine inferential knowledge and those that determine verbal knowledge are not the same.” The Nyāya position is that comprehension and acceptance are normally fused such that (normally) we do get knowledge immediately (non-inferentially) from being told. Here they join Mīmāṃsā, though there is also much controversy on this matter between the two Vedic schools.
Gautama在Nyayya-sūtra提供了一个定义1.1.7：“见证是专家（āpta）的（真实）声明。”专家“āpta是一个值得信赖的权威机构，”专家“不完全足够翻译。Vātsyāyana在定义这个术语时概述了一个道德层面。āpta是一个不仅知道真相，而是想通过欺骗传达的人（Vātsyāyana在Nyāya-sūtra1.1.7的评论）。评论员也在知识来源的工作中带出了一定的平均主义。他表示，即使是外国人，即使外国人 - “野蛮人”也可以是专家，他们的言论传达给我们的证言知识，一如以往，他们一如既往地知道真相，并希望沟通没有欺骗。
Gautama provides a definition at Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.7: “Testimony is the (true) statement of an expert (āpta).” An “expert,” āpta, is a trustworthy authority such that “expert” is not entirely adequate as a translation. Vātsyāyana in defining the term outlines a moral dimension. An āpta is a person who not only knows the truth but who wants to communicate it without deception (Vātsyāyana’s commentary under Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.7). The commentator also brings out a certain egalitarianism in the workings of the knowledge source. Contra the privilege afforded the priestly caste in matters of Vedic interpretation, he says that even foreigners—“barbarians,” mleccha—can be the experts whose statements convey to us testimonial knowledge, provided, as always, they know the truth and want to communicate without deception.
The process of generating testimonial knowledge begins with a speaker S who knows a proposition p by perception, inference, or testimony (chains of testimony are okay) and who has a desire to communicate p to someone or other. A hearer H gains knowledge through a speech act of S communicating p to H, who has to be competent in the language in which p is expressed, to know the words and grammatical forms, which H has learned, on most accounts, also chiefly through testimony but also in other ways such as analogy (according to some).
Mīmāṃsā, whose leaders Kumārila and Prabhākara are followed by many Vedāntins and by some Nyāya philosophers, comes to the debate about testimony with an axe to grind, namely, to defend Vedic authority. The words of the Veda are not spoken by anyone originally. Speakers are subject to error but not the Veda, whose verses are not originally composed (apauruṣeya). Vedāntic theists, in the main, along with almost all Nyāya philosophers, take the position that like all sentences, those of the Veda should be understood as spoken (or composed, etc.) by someone with the intention to communicate. Thus God, īśvara, is the author of the Veda (the best or only candidate, according to Udayana, eleventh century, Nyāya-kusumāñjalī). Mīmāṃsā, however, is atheistic, viewing the Veda as primordial, resounding in the ether that surrounds the universe, heard and memorized (in this cycle of creation) by the great rishis in their pellucid consciousness (not cluttered by ordinary thought). Thus according to Mīmāṃsā, sentences can be meaningful without having a speaker with an intention to communicate. Vedāntin and Nyāya theists generalize from the everyday to assume that, no, statements and sentences require a speaker, a composer, who, in the case of S’s knowledge passing to H, must be an āpta expert, i.e., someone who knows the truth and wants to tell it without a desire to deceive. God is this speaker in the case of the Veda, it is inferred by some.
Prābhākara认为，每一个见证知识都像所有的知识一样穿着它的袖子上的真理; 同样的吠陀知识。演讲者的意图是无关紧要的。鹦鹉可以让我们知道像磁带录音机。甚至骗人的骗子（S）也可以沟通呃试图欺骗H，他通过S的声明来学习真相。相比之下，Nyāya支持说话者的意图，tātparya，在认识上相关。根据后来的作者，演讲者的意图不是H的部分的推荐知识的触发（而是H的解释下的传播句子），而是与认证相关的稍微上游的因果因素。如果我们知道这是一个鹦鹉或一个骗子，谁负责的声明，我们将不再相信。这是真的，H必须了解鹦鹉的情况等等。否则，没有什么可以检查，发现鹦鹉的发言是一个“明显的证词”śabda-ābhāsa（例如，Gaṅgeśa， Tattva-cintā-maṇi，见证章，329）。但是，在某些情况下，明确的发言者的意图被认为是消除歧义的必要条件，并且与根据许多包括作家在美学文学中称为alaṅkāra-śāstra的引用比喻性言语有关。
The Prābhākara takes the view that everyday testimonial knowledge wears, like all knowledge, its truth on its sleeve; similarly Vedic knowledge. Speaker’s intention is irrelevant. A parrot can make us know something like a tape-recorder. And even a liar (S) deceived into believing p can communicate ¬p trying to deceive H who nevertheless learns the truth through S’s statement. Nyāya, in contrast, champions speaker’s intention, tātparya, as epistemically relevant. According to the later writers, speaker’s intention is not the trigger of testimonial knowledge on H’s part (which is instead the transmitting sentence under the interpretation of H), but is a slightly upstream causal factor relevant for certification. If we knew it were a parrot or a liar who was responsible for the statement, we would no longer believe. It is true that H has to understand something in the case of the parrot, etc. Otherwise, there would be nothing to check in finding out that the parrot’s speaking is a case of “apparent testimony,” śabda-ābhāsa (e.g., Gaṅgeśa, Tattva-cintā-maṇi, testimony chapter, 329). But discerning speaker’s intention is championed as necessary for disambiguation in some cases of testimony and as relevant to triggering figurative speech according to many including writers in the aesthetics literature called alaṅkāra-śāstra.
证明知识是一个理解一个陈述，一个传递句子的问题，并且作为传送句子必须满足某些条件。在整个哲学和语法文献中提出和讨论了有意义的陈述的以下三个必要条件（Kunjunni Raja 1969：149-169）。
Testimonial knowledge is a matter of comprehending a statement, a transmitting sentence, and to be a transmitting sentence certain conditions must be met. The following three necessary conditions for a meaningful statement are proposed and discussed throughout the philosophical and grammatical literatures (Kunjunni Raja 1969: 149–169).
- grammatical “expectancy,” ākāṅkṣā
- semantic “fittingness,” yogyatā
- proper presentation (pronunciation and the like), āsatti
一句话中的单词在完成句子时，具有相互满足的语法“期待”作为一串单词。这个和第三个条件对于语言意义来说显然是必需的，但不是第二个，至少不是西方语言的哲学家，虽然这个概念似乎与早期现代哲学所理解的先验有关。无论如何，语义“适应性”与整个学校的比喻意义理论有关，包括美学文学。一个股票的负面例子是“园丁在用火浇灌植物”（agnināsiñcati）。浇水不能用火烧，所以这些词的意思不合，除了可能是比喻的。有些以积极的方式定义瑜伽，但似乎很容易找到反例（Kunjunni Raja 1969：164-166）。语言必须灵活，以便我们能够报告新奇事物。此外，当我们了解虚假陈述时，我们会了解一些事情。否则，再一次，我们不知道在哪里去确定它的虚伪或真相。Gaṅgeśa明确表示，虚假陈述和怀疑声明符合语义适应性要求（Tattva-cintā-maṇi，见证篇，372-373）。即使是不仅仅是假的，而是我们所知道的语句是假的，可以通过语义适应性测试，例如（在A.Chakrabarti，1994）中，反对者的观点！由于这些原因和其他原因，Gaṅgeśa作为一个定义，将yogyatā定义为“缺乏阻止知识（证明知识）”（Tattva-cintā-maṇi，见证篇，梵文，IV.iii.6，第136页） 。这显示了一致的领带。
The words in a sentence have their grammatical “expectancy” mutually satisfied in the completion of the sentence as a string of words. This and the third condition are pretty obviously required for sentential meaning, but not the second, at least not to philosophers of language in the West, although the notion seems related to the a priori as understood in early modern philosophy. In any case, semantic “fittingness” is connected to a theory of figurative meaning throughout the schools including the aesthetics literature. A stock negative example is “The gardener is watering the plants with fire” (agninā siñcati). Watering cannot be done with fire, and so the meanings of the words do not fit together except possibly figuratively. Some define yogyatā in a positive fashion, but it seems easy to find counterexamples (Kunjunni Raja 1969: 164–166). Language has to be flexible so that we can report novelties. Furthermore, we understand something when we understand a false statement. Otherwise, again, we would not know where to look to determine its falsity, or truth, for that matter. Gaṅgeśa says explicitly that false statements as well as statements of doubt meet the requirement of semantic fittingness (Tattva-cintā-maṇi, testimony chapter, 372–373). Even statements that are not just false but that we know are false can pass the semantic-fittingness test, as, for example, (in the quip by A. Chakrabarti 1994) the views of one’s opponents! For these and other reasons, Gaṅgeśa, for one, defines yogyatā negatively as “absence of knowledge of a blocker (of testimonial knowledge)” (Tattva-cintā-maṇi, testimony chapter, Sanskrit, IV.iii.6, p. 136). This shows a coherence tie. We cannot even understand testimony way out of whack with what we know already.
两个Māmāṃsā意见争夺解释统一统一，连同三分之一，属于语法Bhartṛhari（第三世纪）的句子整体主义者，认为这个词在句子的上下文之外没有意义，这是基本的语义单位。言语是从句子中抽象出来的，句子被全盘地“闪现”（sphoṭa;Bhartṛhari的理论叫做sphoṭa-vāda）。这是Mīmāāsākas的一个容易的目标，指向我们在不同句子中使用相同的词语的能力。但是，一个阵营Prābhākara同意语法学家的意思，除了被认为是完整的句子之外，除了充分的事实之外，这个词不会传达意义，而是表示“一闪而过”，就像它一样。另一个营，Bhāṭṭa，其理论被Nyayya接管，声称个别词语孤立地引用，而在理解句子中，我们理解单词语义单元的含义，通过句子的组合，通过实现所有句法预期以及单词的含义，意思是说相关的事情。这两个观点在Sanskrit anvita-abhidhāna-vāda中被称为“连接的参考”，Siderits（1991）将其转换为“相关的指定视图”，和abhihita-anvaya-vāda，“指示物的连接”，Siderits翻译为“加关系观”。是指相关的事物。这两个观点在Sanskrit anvita-abhidhāna-vāda中被称为“连接的参考”，Siderits（1991）将其转换为“相关的指定视图”，和abhihita-anvaya-vāda，“指示物的连接”，Siderits翻译为“加关系观”。是指相关的事物。这两个观点在Sanskrit anvita-abhidhāna-vāda中被称为“连接的参考”，Siderits（1991）将其转换为“相关的指定视图”，和abhihita-anvaya-vāda，“指示物的连接”，Siderits翻译为“加关系观”。
Two Mīmāṃsā views compete to explain sentential unity, along with a third, a sentence holism belonging to the grammarian Bhartṛhari (third century), who holds that words have no meaning outside the context of the sentence, which is the basic semantic unit. Words are abstractions from sentences, and a sentence is understood holistically “in a flash” (sphoṭa; Bhartṛhari’s theory is called sphoṭa-vāda). This is an easy target for the Mīmāṃsākas, who point to our abilities to use the same words in different sentences. But the one camp, the Prābhākara, agrees with the grammarian that words do not convey meaning apart from the full sentence being understood, that is to say, apart from the full fact indicated being known “in a flash,” as it were. The other camp, the Bhāṭṭa, whose theory comes to be taken over by Nyāya, claims that individual words have reference in isolation, and that in understanding a sentence we understand the meaning of the individual semantic units which get combined by the sentence, by the fulfillment of all the syntactic expectancy along with the meaning of the words, to mean the things denoted in relation. These two views are termed in Sanskrit anvita-abhidhāna-vāda, “reference of the connected,” which Siderits (1991) translates as the “related designation view,” and abhihita-anvaya-vāda, “connection of the referents,” which Siderits translates as the “words-plus-relation view.”
后者的渲染可能有点误导。关系不仅仅是一个额外的元素：它不是字加关系。在梵文中只有少数纯逻辑和语法上有约束力的词，只有几个（主要是连词）只是同义词，因为每一个其他的单词都被转换，并且不需要介词等。或者，我们可以说每个单词是不饱和的，因为没有单词，没有单一的语义单元独立地传达句子的含义，而与其至少一个其他单元的关系无关。两个意见之间的主要区别是，前者坚持认为只有一句话成功地引用，而不是一个句子组成的单词，其含义必须相互关联，以供参考（abhidhā，主要模式或电源，śakti，语言）; 而后者则认为单词的确单独具有参考，而不是由整个句子给出的所提及的事物的联系。在这两种情况下，以句子的方式知道的事实或对象都是三方面的。在第二种观点中，事实上是“指示物”这个词与世界的关联性，一个没有由语义单位表示的相关性（anvaya）。连接是指所提及的事物之间的连接，这是世界上由于秩序和连接性（anvaya）而变得意识到的连接。Gopikamohan Bhattacharya写了apropos（十七世纪）Annambhaṭṭa对Bhāṭṭa理论的讨论（Annambhaṭṭa：301-302）：“这就是说，对一个声明的理解，由组成条款相互指示的内容取决于所要求的顺序列出条款。但是，条款的安排顺序本身并不是判刑的一个术语，所以不能说这个命令有自己的śakti这样的条款。“
The latter rendering may be a little misleading. The relation is not just an additional element: it’s not words-plus-relation. There are only a few purely logical and syntactically binding words in Sanskrit, only a few (mainly connectives) that are just syncategorematic, since every other word is inflected and there is no need for prepositions, etc. Alternatively, we could say that every word is unsaturated because no word, no single semantic unit, conveys the meaning of a sentence by itself alone independently of its relation to at least one other unit. The main difference between the two Mīmāṃsā views is that the former insists that only a sentence successfully refers, not the individual words of which a sentence is composed, whose meanings have to be connected to one another in order for there to be reference (abhidhā, the primary mode or power, śakti, of language); whereas the latter holds that words do have reference individually but not to the connection of the things mentioned, which is given by the sentence as a whole. In both cases, the fact or object known by way of a sentence has constituents. On the second view, the fact is the relatedness of the words’ referents as they are in the world, a relatedness (anvaya) not indicated by a semantic unit. The connection is to one another of the things referred to, a connection in the world which we become aware of because of the order and connectedness (anvaya) of the words. Gopikamohan Bhattacharya writes apropos (seventeenth-century) Annambhaṭṭa’s discussion of the Bhāṭṭa theory (Annambhaṭṭa: 301–302): “It comes to this then that the understanding of a statement, i.e., of what is signified by the constituent terms in relation to one another, depends among other things on the presentation of the terms in the required order. But the order of arrangement of the terms is not itself a term of the sentence, so that it cannot be said that this order has its own śakti like the terms.”
一个字指的是有时不明确，而不仅仅是从内在的上下文，而是在它内。仍然我们知道这个词是什么意思。我们知道，即使在Sanskrit，用于盐的词语“saindhava”也是一句话，就是说话者想要盐。S在沟通中的意图在这种情况下是消除歧义的关键，因为S在一个上下文中说话（prakaraṇa）。通常，根据新尼亚哲学家的观点，整体情况不需要考虑，以确定一个句子的意义，只能满足语法，语义适应性和适当发音的三个条件。但是我们必须考虑到整体情况 - 让我们说“发言人的意图”，tātparya - 这是强调的（例如，Annambhaṭṭa：294-295），
Just what a word refers to is sometimes ambiguous not just apart from sentential context but within it. Still we know what the word means. We know that a speaker wants salt when S asks for it even though in Sanskrit the word used for salt, ‘saindhava’, is a homonym with a word that means horse. S’s intention to communicate p is in such a case crucial to disambiguation in that S speaks in a context (prakaraṇa). Ordinarily, the overall context need not be taken into account, according to New Nyāya philosophers, to ascertain the meaning of a sentence, which has to meet only the three conditions of grammaticality, semantic fittingness, and proper pronunciation. But we do have to take into account the overall context—let us say “speaker’s intention,” tātparya—it is stressed (e.g., by Annambhaṭṭa: 294–295), in some cases of ambiguity as also of figurative speech, which involves a second power of words, the power (śakti) to express meaning indirectly.
However, we have to be able to understand a spoken sentence to be able to determine a speaker’s intention, which we infer from what is said supplemented sometimes by contextual cues. Thus knowing the intention is not an invariable antecedent of testimonial knowledge. Understanding S’s intention is not a fourth condition on a statement’s meaningfulness from the perspective of H—except in some cases of ambiguity and indirect, figurative speech. But in those cases it is indeed crucial, and there is no way to get around the need to make it out in order to fix the meaning, which cannot be gathered at, so to say, a first pass.
But on a second pass, we are able to gather not only indirect, secondary meaning but also more information through inference. In this way, Annambhaṭṭa would explain what others see as the results of the activation of a third power of words, namely, dhvani, also called vyañjana, “suggestion” (289–293). In other words, if a sentence contains an ambiguous word or indirect, figurative meaning (admitted as a bona fide second power of words, śakti), there may well be no way to tell what it means without considering S’s intention. Now advocates of the third power analyze the stock example of indirect speech where a village is said to be in the Gaṅgā as suggesting that the village is cool and purified by association with the Gaṅgā. The whole point, they argue, of poetic use of indirect, figurative speech is to release the third power of suggestion. Why otherwise not simply say that the village is on the river bank? The speaker uses the figurative speech to suggest the attributes of coolness and purification. Annambhaṭṭa responds that if one understands from the statement these attributes then the indirect, figurative meaning (lakṣaṇā) of “in the Gaṅgā” is not just being on the bank of the river but on a bank that lends coolness and fosters purification. This is then just a more complex case of lakṣaṇā, which is indeed a second power of words (but there is no third), indicating a cool and purifying location on the indicated bank.
最后，我们可以提到，在所有三种情绪条件都符合的情况下，无论是具有比喻意义的真实证据知识，我们都没有注意到传递句子或句子的语法等。这些因素必须存在，但我们不需要意识到这些因素。相比之下，我们必须注意到一个阻碍者（在Nyāya-sūtra2.2.59下的Uddyotakara），它可能被认为是违反语义拟合（Kunjunni Raja 1969：166），尽管这不是正确的根据几个理论家，他们提供了不违反语义适应性的数字的例子。发生不太严重的失配的例子比用火的水发生。违反yogyatā不是触发第二个词语的唯一途径。
Finally we might mention that with veridical testimonial knowledge not involving figurative meaning where all three sentential conditions are met, we do not notice the grammaticality, etc., of the transmitting sentence or sentences. These factors have to be present, but we do not have to be aware of them. For figurative meaning, in contrast, we have to notice a blocker (Uddyotakara under Nyāya-sūtra 2.2.59), which paradigmatically may be thought of as a violation of semantic fittingness (Kunjunni Raja 1969: 166), though this is not precisely correct according to several theorists who provide examples of figures where semantic fittingness is not violated. Examples of less severe misfit occur than to water with fire. Violating yogyatā is not the only way to trigger the second power of words. Yet further exploration of figurative meaning and of “suggestion” (dhvani) would carry us outside of the epistemological into the aesthetics and grammatical literatures.
- Analogy and Other Candidate Sources
7.1 Analogy and Similarity
简单来说，我们可以考虑在古典文学中提出的更多异国情调的候选人，主要是在Māmāṃsā（通常由Vedāntins阐述）中，从类比开始，被认为是Mīmāāsā和Vedānta相似性知识的普遍原则，但被其他学校拒绝，吠陀和非吠陀一样，除了Nyayya，然而它提供了一个彻底的重新诠释。为了提供吠陀禁令的解释学，使其适用于实际演习中的练习，Mīmāṃsāexegetes需要能够将一种类型的粮食替代为另一种，例如一种或另一种动物，取决于在第一名，但相似之处在第二位。在Vedānta，比喻可以理解，由Kumar（1980：110）指出的，对于在精神或瑜伽经验与普通人的经验之间进行比较的Upanishads。Yogācāra，吉安娜和Nyayya逻辑学家发现相似性或相关的相似性 - 推论中的数字作为知识生成过程。通过认识相似性和不相似性，我们根据推理知识所需的知识到达渗透。厨房炉灶是股票推论中的“例子”，因为它与作为调查中心的山脉有相似的相似性。它是所谓的sapakṣa的一部分，一组积极的相关性，使我们知道推理基础的渗透。作为Nyayya类似的知识来源，Nyayya（或Yogācāra等）没有观察到相似性的知识，类比只限于一个学科学习一个词的含义（而Yogācāra不认为它是一个单独的pramāṇa）。但是，通过从案例或甚至单个案例的泛化而知道普遍性，预先假设相关相似性的知识可能是一个感知问题。
Briefly we may consider the more exotic candidate sources proposed in the classical literature mainly within Mīmāṃsā (often elaborated by Vedāntins), beginning with analogy, which is viewed as the pramāṇa for knowledge of similarity in Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta but is rejected by the other schools, Vedic and non-Vedic alike, except for Nyāya which however provides a radical reinterpretation. To provide a hermeneutics of Vedic injunctions to make them suitable for practice in actual performances, the Mīmāṃsā exegetes need to be able to designate substitutes, of one type of grain for another, for example, or one animal for another, depending upon availability in the first place but upon similarity in the second place. In Vedānta, analogy is useful for understanding the Upanishads which make comparisons between spiritual or yogic experience and the experiences of ordinary humans, as pointed out by Kumar (1980: 110). Yogācāra, Jaina, and Nyāya logicians find similarity—or relevant similarity—to figure in inference as a knowledge-generating process. It is through cognizing similarity and dissimilarity that we arrive at knowledge of pervasion as required for inferential knowledge. A kitchen hearth counts as an “example” in the stock inference because of its relevant similarity to the mountain which is the center of inquiry. It is part of what is called the sapakṣa, the set of positive correlations, that make us know an inference-underpinning pervasion. Knowledge of similarity is not viewed in Nyāya (or Yogācāra, etc.) as the result of analogy as a knowledge source—for Nyāya, analogy is restricted to a subject’s learning the meaning of a word (and Yogācāra does not countenance it as a separate pramāṇa). But pervasion is known through generalization from cases or even a single case, presupposing knowledge of relevant similarity which can be a matter of perception.
Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā philosophers, who take similarity to be a special object known through this special source, give examples different from the stock scenario provided by Gautama and elaborated by Vātsyāyana (under Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.8) who limit the scope of analogy to learning the meaning of a word. But for brevity’s sake, let us take up only the Nyāya theory. A subject S inquires of a forester about a gavaya, which is a kind of buffalo, having heard the word ‘gavaya’ used among his schoolmates but not knowing what it means, i.e., not knowing what a gavaya is. Questioned by S, the forester replies that a gavaya is like a cow mentioning certain specifics as also some dissimilarities. To simplify, Nyāya philosophers say that the forester makes an analogical statement (“A gavaya is like a cow”), whereby our subject S now knows in general (sāmānyataḥ) what the word means, according to Gaṅgeśa and followers (Tattva-cintā-maṇi, analogy chapter). But S does not yet know how it is used, does not know its reference, which is deemed a word’s primary meaning. Later encountering a gavaya buffalo, S says, “This, which is similar to a cow, is the meaning of the word ‘gavaya’,” a statement which expresses S’s new analogical knowledge. The knowledge has been generated by analogy, its “knowledge source,” pramāṇa.
The ontology of similarity is controversial. Several different theories are proposed, one of the best of which belongs to Gaṅgeśa, who sees it as a relational property supervening on other properties and defined as something’s having a lot of the same properties as something else. It is not a universal, he argues, for similarity relates a correlate (the gavaya buffalo) and a countercorrelate (the cow), whereas a universal, in contrast, rests as a unity in, for example, with cowhood, all individual cows. In this way it is like contact, samyoga, but there are also rather obvious differences. It is not reducible to any single category among the traditional seven (substance, quality, motion, universal, individualizer, inherence, and absence), for some substances are like one another as are certain qualities and actions. But similarity also is not, pace the Prābhākara, a category over and above the recognized seven. Gaṅgeśa’s main argument there is that similarity is not uniform. It is to an extent a property that is mind-imposed in that the counterpositive (the cow) is supplied from our side. Moreover, it supervenes on other properties.
7.2 “Circumstantial Implication” (arthāpatti)
另一个由Mīmāṃsā和Vedānta哲学家倡导的候选人物，却被其他所有人拒绝为独立的pramāṇa是一种推理，Nyayya认为与“唯一”推论相同的最佳解释（见上文）。一个股票的例子：从“Fat Devadatta在白天不吃”（以知觉和/或见证而闻名）的前提下，结论已知（由arthāpatti），“他晚上吃饭”。对于Nyāya，推论这不是特殊的来源）可以被重建，其中F =“是脂肪但不在白天吃”，G =“晚上吃”：F，那个人G;什么不是（F）不是（G），像Maitra（谁在白天吃饭，而不是在晚上）。这只是一个“消极的”推论，只要不要在晚上观察到Devadatta吃饭，而且还没有其他人知道像他一样肥胖，只有在晚上被观察到吃饭。我们知道他晚上吃了（虽然没有被观察到），我们的感应基底只包括负相关。 Mīmāṃsā拒绝这种分析，并且相反，间接意义是一个独立的知识来源和一个重要的，基本的语言理解和各种日常事实的知识。推理不是推论，因为没有普遍的知识，这是普遍的争论。
Another candidate source championed by Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta philosophers but rejected by everyone else as an independent pramāṇa is arthāpatti, a kind of reasoning to the best explanation which Nyāya views as the same as “negative-only” inference (see above). A stock example: from the premise, “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day” (known by perception and/or testimony), the conclusion is known (by arthāpatti), “He eats at night.” For Nyāya, the inference (which is no special source) can be reconstructed where F = “is fat but does not eat during the day” and G = “eats at night”: Whoso F, that person G; what is not so (F) is not so (G), like Maitra (who eats during the day and not at night). This would be a “negative-only” inference so long as not only has Devadatta not been observed to eat at night but also there is no one else known to be like him in being fat and having been observed to eat only at night. We do know that he eats at night (though this has not been observed), and our inductive base is comprised only of negative correlations. Mīmāṃsā rejects this analysis and holds in contrast that circumstantial implication is an independent knowledge source and an important one, operative in basic language comprehension as well as in knowledge of various everyday facts. The reasoning is not inferential because no pervasion is known, it is commonly argued.
7.3 “Non-cognition” (anupalabdhi)
我们如何知道缺席？我知道我的眼镜不在桌子上，但如何？Dharmakīrti将回答“通过推论”，认为缺席是由Yogācārin确定的三种基本类型之一（见上文）。“如果大象在房间里，我（S）会感觉到它。我（S）不认识大象。因此，房间里没有大象“ - 类似地，我的眼镜不在桌子上（假设桌子不那么杂乱，可以隐藏）。Gautama和Vātsyāyana没有详细说明，同意缺席是已知的（Nyāya-sūtra2.2.2）。但是，Uddyotakara和后来的传统认为我们有时知道缺席。当我在桌子上找到他时，我马上认识到我的眼镜缺席。
How do we know absences? I know that my glasses are not on the table but how? Dharmakīrti would answer, “By inference,” inferential knowledge of an absence being one of three fundamental types identified by the Yogācārin (see above). “If an elephant were in the room, I (S) would perceive it. I (S) do not perceive an elephant. Therefore, there is no elephant in the room”—similarly for my glasses not being on the table (presuming the table is not so cluttered that they could be concealed). Gautama and Vātsyāyana, without elaborating, agree that absences are known inferentially (Nyāya-sūtra 2.2.2). But Uddyotakara and the later tradition argue that we know absences sometimes perceptually. I cognize immediately my glasses’ absence when I look for them on the table.
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā says no, there is operative here a special knowledge source called “non-cognition” or “non-perception,” anupalabdhi. The main arguments center on the sufficiency of perception, or inference, to make known such negative facts, which clearly we do know. The Bhāṭṭa argues, for example, that perception makes known only presences. Indeed, Nyāya has a difficult time assimilating such knowledge to its theory of perception, in particular since the difficulty widens into what is known in analytic philosophy as the generality problem. Nyāya recognizes that an absence has a peculiar relational structure, namely, to relate a locus (the table) to an absentee (my glasses) and that the absentee is furnished by the cognizer entirely from memory. If memory can have such a crucial role in a type of perception, how then to draw the limits on what is perceptible? The Nyāya project threatens to spin out of control. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is a large literature on absence and its epistemology.
7.4 Gesture and Rumor
We learn some things from gesture (ceṣṭā), such as to come when beckoned by a conventionalized movement of the hand. Gaṅgeśa says this is a form of testimonial knowledge, and devotes a section to its assimilation (Tattva-cintā-maṇi, testimony chapter, 922–926). Rumor (aitihya) is defined by Vātsyāyana (under Nyāya-sūtra 2.2.1) as a testimony chain whose originator is unknown. The Nyāya attitude is to regard even it as presumptively veridical in consonance with the school’s overall theory of testimony.
- “Suppositional Reasoning” (tarka)
[许多印度古典哲学家认为，表面的现象不足以解释某种情况下的信仰。即使我们的信仰/认知确实是由被认为是知识来源的过程产生的，也无法解释那些反对的研究，在面对反对的研究中或是合理的挑战中，他们是不值得信任的，也无法指引意志(?)和行为。有一个社会层面的知识，可以用推理的方式在根源上解决争论。这就是tarka方式，假定的或者叫做想象上的推论。一个典型的tarka要求建立一个基于已经被证实为事实的命题上的假设，这个命题应该也被证实为既支持推定来源，也支持反对推定来源的观点]。一个论文和一个逆转手段，例如，显然是真正的推论（最常见的情况）或竞争的感性或证明证据。通过假设对手论文的真实性（在苏格拉底风格中），表明它如何导致不可接受的后果或打破另一个智力规范，人们就会承认推定真理，古典认识论学家从来不会强调 - 提供自己的论点确实至少在其角落出现知识来源。学校的共识是，这种论据本身并不在于知识产生者，而是可以摆脱有理由相信的平衡。
[Many classical Indian philosophers held that apparent certification may not be enough to warrant belief in some instances. Even if our beliefs/cognitions have indeed been generated by processes that would be counted knowledge sources did they not face counterconsiderations, in facing counterconsiderations—in being reasonably challenged—they are not trustworthy and do not guide unhesitating effort and action. There is a social dimension to knowledge, where reasoning reigns resolving controversy in ways over and above the sources. These are the ways of tarka, “hypothetical” or “suppositional reasoning.” Paradigmatically, tarka is called for in order to establish a presumption of truth in favor of one thesis that has putative source support against a rival thesis that also has putative source support, a thesis and a counterthesis both backed up by, for example, apparently genuine inferences (the most common situation) or by competing perceptual or testimonial evidence. By supposing the truth of the rival thesis and (in Socratic style) showing how it leads to unacceptable consequences or breaks another intellectual norm, one repossesses a presumption of truth, provided—the classical epistemologists never tire of emphasizing—provided one’s own thesis does indeed have at least the appearance of a knowledge source in its corner. The consensus across schools is that such arguments are not in themselves knowledge-generators, but they can swing the balance concerning what it is rational to believe.
哲学家们擅长使用假定推论，根据广义上的一致性标准(也是简单的标准)，描绘出了对立观点的影响，(?并且对已经公认为事实的相对观点进行实验)。 对于使用tarka就像Crest Jewel of Reasoning的古典哲学家们来说，荣誉和著作是生活的重要组成部分
Suppositional reasoning is what a philosopher is good at, drawing out of implications of opposed views and testing them against mutually accepted positions, according to, broadly speaking, criteria of coherence but also of simplicity. Here we come to the vital center of the life of a classical philosopher, which is reflected in honorific appellations and book titles, dozens of which use ‘tarka’ as in “Crest Jewel of Reasoning” (tarka-śiro-maṇi).
Udayana (Nyāya, eleventh century) appears to inherit a sixfold division of tarka according to the nature of the error in an opponent’s position, and expressly lists five types (a sixth, “contradiction” or “opposition,” either being assumed as the most common variety, or subsumed under Udayana’s fifth type, “unwanted consequence”). Philosophers from other schools present distinct but overlapping lists. The Nyāya textbook-writer, Viśvanātha, of the early seventeenth century, mentions ten, Udayana’s five plus five more, many of which are used by the Advaitin Śrīharṣa (probably Udayana’s younger contemporary) among other reasoners. They are: (1) self-dependence (begging the question), (2) mutual dependence (mutual presupposition), (3) circularity (reasoning in a circle), (4) infinite regress, and (5) unwanted consequence (including contradiction presumably)—Udayana’s five—plus (6) being presupposed by the other, the first established (a form of “favorable” suppositional reasoning), (7) (hasty) generalization, (8) differentiation failure, (9) theoretic lightness, and (10) theoretic heaviness.
这是tarka建立反对怀疑的推定。Gaṅgeśa（十四世纪）：“是一个人P，谁确定了彻底的正相关（F在哪里G）和负相关（无G，否F），怀疑一个效果可能会没有原因，然后 - 采取举起烟火的例子 - 为什么P应该像火一样冒烟（在这种情况下，说是想要摆脱蚊子）？（类似地）食物来消除饥饿，和言语沟通给另一个人？“（菲利普斯1995年的翻译：160-161，略有修改）。在Nyāya-sūtra和其他作品中发现的论点（例如， Vātsyāyana，Nyāya-sūtra1.1.1的序言）是，没有信心以知识为前提，我们不会象我们这样做。
It is tarka that establishes a presumption against skepticism. Gaṅgeśa (fourteenth century): “Were a person P, who has ascertained thoroughgoing positive correlations (F wherever G) and negative correlations (wherever no G, no F), to doubt that an effect might arise without a cause, then—to take up the example of smoke and fire—why should P, as he does, resort to fire for smoke (in the case, say, of a desire to get rid of mosquitoes)? (Similarly) to food to allay hunger, and to speech to communicate to another person?” (Translation from Phillips 1995: 160–161, slightly modified.) The argument, which is found in the Nyāya-sūtra and other works (e.g., Vātsyāyana, preamble to Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.1), is that without the confidence that presupposes knowledge, we would not act as we do.
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