First published Wed Apr 5, 2017
“感知学习”大体上是指由实践或经验导致的长期持续的感知变化（参见EJ Gibson 1963）。例如，威廉·詹姆斯写道，一个人如何能够通过某种酒的上下半部分的味道来区分（1890：509）。假设人的感知的变化持续下去，是真正的感性（而不是说是一个学习的推论），并且是基于以前的经验，詹姆斯的情况就是感性学习的一个例子。
“Perceptual Learning” refers, roughly, to long-lasting changes in perception that result from practice or experience (see E.J. Gibson 1963). William James, for instance, writes about how a person can become able to differentiate by taste between the upper and lower half of a bottle for a particular kind of wine (1890: 509). Assuming that the change in the person’s perception lasts, is genuinely perceptual (rather than, say, a learned inference), and is based on prior experience, James’ case is a case of perceptual learning.
This entry has three parts. The first part lays out the definition of perceptual learning as long-term changes in perception that result from practice or experience, and then distinguishes perceptual learning from several contrast classes. The second part specifies different varieties of perceptual learning. The third part details cases of perceptual learning in the philosophical literature and says why they are philosophically significant.
- Defining Perceptual Learning
1963年，心理学家埃莉诺·吉布森（Eleanor Gibson）撰写了一篇关于感知学习的里程碑式调查文章，她认为这个术语定义了这个术语。根据吉布森，感知学习是“在这个阵列的实践或经验之后，对刺激阵列的感知相对永久和持续的变化”（1963：29）。[ 1 ] ·吉布森的定义有三个基本组成部分。首先，感性学习是持久的。第二，它是感性的。第三，这是实践或经验的结果。此条目扩展了定义的每个功能。
In 1963, the psychologist Eleanor Gibson wrote a landmark survey article on perceptual learning in which she purported to define the term. According to Gibson, perceptual learning is “[a]ny relatively permanent and consistent change in the perception of a stimulus array, following practice or experience with this array…” (1963: 29). Gibson’s definition has three basic parts. First, perceptual learning is long-lasting. Second, it is perceptual. Third, it is the result of practice or experience. This entry expands on each of these features of the definition.
1.1 Perceptual Learning as Long-Term Perceptual Changes
Perceptual learning involves long-term changes in perception. This criterion rules out short term perceptual changes due to sensory adaptation (for more on sensory adaptation see Webster 2012). In the waterfall illusion, for instance, a person who looks at a waterfall for a minute, and then looks away at some rocks, sees the rocks as moving even though they are not. This is a short-term change in perception, lasting perhaps for fifteen to thirty seconds. Since it is not a long-term change in perception, however, it does not count as perceptual learning. In another short term adaptive change, a person who goes indoors after walking through a blizzard may have trouble as her eyes adjust to the new lighting. There is a change in her perception as a result of her experience in the blizzard. But it is not a long-term change, and so it does not count as perceptual learning.
While there are clear cases of long-term experience-induced perceptual changes and clear cases of short-term experience-induced perceptual changes, there may be intermediary cases where it is difficult to tell whether they count as long-term or not. In such cases, in order to determine whether the case is a genuine case of perceptual learning, it may be necessary to look at the mechanisms involved (see section 2 below on the mechanisms of perceptual learning). If the mechanisms involved are characteristic of other cases of perceptual learning, then that is a reason to count the case as an instance of perceptual learning. If the mechanisms involved are uncharacteristic of perceptual learning, then that is a reason not to count the case as an instance of perceptual learning.
1.2 Perceptual Learning as Perceptual Changes
感知学习涉及知觉的变化 。[ 2 ] 除了别的以外，这排除了审美品味的变化。例如，想象一个反对者只有在其他人不喜欢这些东西的时候才喜欢。假设他发现每个人都喜欢他最喜欢的微博。这可能会让他改变他如何在美学上判断啤酒。然而，啤酒对他来说可能味道一样。所以，这不是感性学习的一个例子，而只是改变人的审美判断。感知学习涉及感知变化的事实也仅仅排除了信仰的变化。假设有人认为他们听到的交响乐是一个神话。如果这个人的看法没有改变，这不是感性学习的情况。这是对人的信仰的改变，而不是对人的看法的改变。
Perceptual learning involves changes in perception. This rules out mere changes in aesthetic taste, among other things. For instance, imagine a contrarian who likes things only insofar as other people do not like those things. Suppose he finds out that everyone else has come to like his favorite microbrew. This might cause him to change how he judges that beer aesthetically. However, the beer may well taste the same to him. So, it is not a case of perceptual learning, but a mere change in the person’s aesthetic judgment. The fact that perceptual learning involves changes in perception also rules out mere changes in belief. Suppose someone acquires the belief that the symphony movement they are hearing is a scherzo. If nothing changes in that person’s perception, this is not a case of perceptual learning. It is a change in the person’s belief, not a change in the person’s perception.
将感性学习与学习区分开来，这只是基于感知，这一点很重要（见Dretske 2015：fn。6）。[ 3 ] 感知学习涉及知觉的变化，而基于知觉的学习则不需要。看着我的桌子，我可能会知道杯子在桌子上。但是，这并不涉及任何长期的感知变化。它是基于感知的学习，但它不是感性学习。此外，我可能会学习每次空的时候将杯子放在洗碗机的桌子上。再次，这是基于感知的学习（我需要察觉杯子才能移动它）。但是，这不是感性学习。
It is important here to distinguish perceptual learning from learning that is simply based on perception (see Dretske 2015: fn. 6). Perceptual learning involves changes in perception, while learning that is based on perception need not. Looking at my table, I might learn that the cup is on the table. However, this does not involve any long-term changes in perception. It is learning that is based on perception, but it is not perceptual learning. Furthermore, I might learn to put the cup on the table into the dishwasher every time it is empty. Again, this is learning that is based on perception (I need to perceive the cup in order to move it). However, it is not perceptual learning.
认为改善感性歧视的主要原因之一可能是真正的感性，是由于神经科学的一些最新证据。正如Manfred Fahle所说，在20世纪70年代和80年代，知觉歧视的改善被认为是认知的而不是感性的（2002：xii）。然而，在20世纪90年代，感知学习研究中由于新的神经科学证据，对认知解释施加了压力。特别地，研究发现，学习诱导的可塑性发生在成年初级感觉皮层中，远远超过研究人员以前的想法（Fahle 2002：xii）。由于学习，成人原发感觉皮层的可塑性的神经学证据提供了一些证据，即知觉歧视的变化可能是由感知学习引起的。（参见Garraghty＆Kass 1992：522; Gilbert 1996：269; Goldstone 2003：238; Gilbert＆Li 2012：250;和Sagi 2011：1552-53）。
One of the main reasons for holding that improvements in perceptual discrimination can be genuinely perceptual is due to somewhat recent evidence from neuroscience. As Manfred Fahle puts it, during the 1970s and 1980s, it tended to be the case that improvements in perceptual discrimination were thought to be cognitive rather than perceptual (2002: xii). However, during the 1990s, pressure was put on the cognitive interpretation due to new neuroscientific evidence in perceptual learning studies. In particular, studies found that learning-induced plasticity occurs in the adult primary sensory cortices much more than researchers had previously thought (Fahle 2002: xii). Neurological evidence of plasticity in adult primary sensory cortices due to learning provides some evidence that changes in perceptual discrimination can be due to perceptual learning. (See also Garraghty & Kass 1992: 522; Gilbert 1996: 269; Goldstone 2003: 238; Gilbert & Li 2012: 250; and Sagi 2011: 1552–53).
1.3 Perceptual Learning as Resulting from Practice or Experience
Perceptual learning involves perceptual changes of a particular kind, namely, those that result from practice or experience. For this reason, laser eye surgery or cataracts removal do not count as instances of perceptual learning. They are not really cases of learning because they do not result from practice or experience. So, while such cases involve long-term changes in perception, they do not count as cases of perceptual learning.
To be authentic cases of learning, perceptual changes have to be the result of a learning process. As a contrast case, suppose someone undergoes a long-term change in their perception due to a brain lesion. Such a change in perception does not result from a learning process, since the change in perception comes from the lesion, rather from practice or experience. Because of this, the case does not count as an instance of perceptual learning, even though it involves a long-term change in perception.
The conversation above roughly follows Eleanor Gibson’s definition of perceptual learning. However, there are also other accounts in the psychology literature. Robert Goldstone’s account of perceptual learning, for instance, agrees with Gibson’s account in many respects, but it additionally offers a story of why perceptual changes occur. On his account,
Perceptual learning involves relatively long-lasting changes to an organism’s perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment and are caused by this environment. (1998: 587, italics added for emphasis)
This definition offers an answer to the question as to why perceptual learning occurs at all. On Goldstone’s account, perceptual learning occurs to improve an organism’s ability to respond to the environment.
Goldstone’s account admits of two different interpretations. On one interpretation, the account places a condition on perceptual learning: that to count as an instance of perceptual learning, a long-term perceptual change has to improve an organism’s ability to respond to the environment. Such an account gains plausibility if one thinks of “learning” as a success-term. The idea then is that each genuine instance of perceptual learning leads to success for the organism, namely, it improves the organism’s ability to respond to the environment. On a second interpretation of Goldstone’s account, however, it is not that each instance of perceptual learning has to improve an organism’s ability to respond to the environment. Rather, it is that perceptual learning is a general capacity for improving an organism’s ability to respond to the environment, even if perceptual learning fails to do so in some instances. Why might organisms have such a capacity? One possibility is that the capacity is a trait that improves fitness and is the product of natural selection. However, the biological origin of perceptual learning is an area of research that still needs to be carefully explored.
1.5 Contrast Classes
1.5.1 Perceptual Development
我们接受婴幼儿感知发展有多少是学习的结果？从概念上讲，发展与学习的区别很大（有些讨论见Carey 2009，特别是第11-14页）。如何将发展与学习区分开来，就是本土主义者和经验主义者之间的传统哲学辩论（见“Marcie 2015”，对该辩论的总结）。例如，在感知学习文献中，凯尔曼和加里宁否认所有感性发展都是学习的结果，认为他们认为是经验主义者（2009：57）。具体来说，他们认为在20世纪80年代及以后收集的关于婴儿感知的数据提供了至少一些知觉发展是天生的证据：
How much of the perceptual development we undergo as infants and young children is the result of learning? There are many difficulties distinguishing development from learning, conceptually (for some discussion, see Carey 2009, especially pp. 11–14). The issue of how to distinguish development from learning bears on the traditional philosophical debate between nativists and empiricists (see Markie 2015, for a summary of that debate). In the perceptual learning literature, for instance, Kellman and Garrigan reject the view that all perceptual development is the result of learning, a view that they consider to be empiricist (2009: 57). Specifically, they think that data on infant perception collected in and around the 1980s provide evidence that at least some perceptual development is innate:
这项研究表明，传统的感性发展的经验主义图片是不正确的。虽然年龄和经验的感知变得更加精确，但各种基本能力 - 例如感知对象，面孔，运动，三维空间，声音方向，协调感知事件的感觉等能力 - 的能力 - 出现主要来自先天或早熟的机制（Bushnell，Sai＆Mullin 1989; Gibson et al。，1979; Held 1985; Kellman＆Spelke 1983; Meltzoff＆Moore 1977; Slater，Mattock，＆Brown 1990）。（Kellman＆Garrigan 2009：57）
What this research has shown is that the traditional empiricist picture of perceptual development is incorrect. Although perception becomes more precise with age and experience, basic capacities of all sorts – such as the abilities to perceive objects, faces, motion, three-dimensional space, the directions of sounds, coordinate the senses in perceiving events, and other abilities – arise primarily from innate or early-maturing mechanisms (Bushnell, Sai, & Mullin 1989; Gibson et al., 1979; Held 1985; Kellman & Spelke 1983; Meltzoff & Moore 1977; and Slater, Mattock, & Brown 1990). (Kellman & Garrigan 2009: 57)
简而言之，根据凯尔曼和加里根（Kellman and Garrigan），关于婴儿感知的证据 - 包括对象感知的认知，面孔的感知以及三维空间的感知 - 都反映出所有感知发展都被学习的观点。
In short, according to Kellman and Garrigan, evidence on infant perception—including evidence about object perception, the perception of faces, and the perception of three-dimensional space—tells against the view that all perceptual development is learned.
If not all perceptual development is learned, while all perceptual learning is learned, then there is a distinction between perceptual development and perceptual learning. One way to draw the distinction more fully is the following. Perceptual development involves perceptual learning. However, it does not just involve perceptual learning. It also involves what is called maturation. For instance, the abilities that Kellman and Garrigan describe above (object perception, the perception of faces, the perception of three-dimensional space, etc.) fall under the category of maturation.
有很多方法可以将知觉成熟与感知学习之间的区别进一步区分开来。在本土主义与经验主义之间的辩论中发现了一些这样的方式（见Samet 2008和Markie 2015），特别是在天生与获得性特征之间的差异（见Griffiths 2009和Cowie 2016）。这里的一个潜在标准是感知成熟的情况涉及到物种典型的知觉能力，而感知学习的情况则涉及不是该物种典型的知觉能力。对于那些参与观鸟活动的人来说，这个标准似乎是适用于一些感知学习的例子。毕竟，在观鸟中获得的知觉能力对于捕鸟者来说是独一无二的，而不是整个人类的典型特征。然而，对于其他更普遍的感知学习实例，标准似乎是错误的。例如，由于人脸对人类无处不在和重要，因此面部感知中涉及的感知学习其实是典型的物种。
There are many ways to try to draw the further distinction between perceptual maturation and perceptual learning. Some such ways are found in the debate between nativism and empiricism (see Samet 2008 and Markie 2015) and specifically in the difference between innate and acquired characteristics (see Griffiths 2009 and Cowie 2016). One potential criterion here is that cases of perceptual maturation involve perceptual abilities that are typical of the species, while cases of perceptual learning involve perceptual abilities that are not typical of the species. This criterion seems to get it right for some instances of perceptual learning, say, for those involved in birdwatching. After all, the perceptual abilities acquired in birdwatching are unique to birdwatchers, not typical of the entire human species. However, the criterion seems to get it wrong for other, more universal, instances of perceptual learning. For instance, since human faces are both ubiquitous and important to humans, the perceptual learning involved in face perception is in fact typical of the species.
在感知学习的文献中，感知学习和知觉成熟之间的区别通常是根据环境的作用来描绘的。在戈德斯通的感性学习叙述中，要算作感性学习，感性变化必须由环境引起。了解为什么戈德斯通认为是环境造成的一个重要特征是重要的。他认为这是至关重要的，因为这个标准区分了仅仅是成熟的结果的知觉变化，以及学习结果的感知变化。正如戈德斯通所说：“如果这些变化不是因为环境投入，那么成熟而不是学习是牵连的”（1998：586）。 曼弗雷德·法勒（Manfred Fahle）同样地说， 成熟术语将 “行为变化的主要推论归结为遗传学而不是环境”（2002：xi）。对于法赫尔来说，这是区别于感性学习的。
In the literature on perceptual learning, by contrast, the distinction between perceptual learning and perceptual maturation is often drawn in terms of the role of the environment. On Goldstone’s account of perceptual learning, to count as perceptual learning, perceptual changes must be caused by the environment. It is important to understand why exactly Goldstone thinks that caused by the environment is a crucial feature of the definition. He thinks it is crucial since this criterion distinguishes between perceptual changes that are simply the result of maturation, and perceptual changes that are the result of learning. As Goldstone puts it, “If the changes are not due to environmental inputs, then maturation rather than learning is implicated” (1998: 586). Manfred Fahle puts it similarly by saying that the term maturation “ascribe[s] the main thrust of the changes in a behavior to genetics, not the environment” (2002: xi). For Fahle, this is what distinguishes it from perceptual learning.
1.5.2 Perception-Based Skills
与感知学习的另一个对比点是基于感知的技能，如掷镖投掷或赛车驾驶。要了解感知学习与知觉技能之间的关系，首先考虑以下情况。Williams和Davids（1998）报道说，当专家足球运动员捍卫对手时，他们比对方的专家更注重对手的臀部。这种引起关注的是从实践或经验中得出的观念的长期变化。那就是感性学习的一个例子（见 下面的2.3节）。这种变化肯定有助于使基于知觉的技能。例如，参加臀部是使足球运动员能够保卫的一部分。由于臀部提供了进攻球员接下来会做什么的提示，当防守者出席时，它可以帮助他们做各种各样的事情：让进攻球员免受他们的运球; 让进攻球员不要完成通行证; 并防止他们射击和得分。没有注意调整，专家足球运动员将无法像基准那样高出基准。
A further point of contrast with perceptual learning is perception-based skills, such as dart-throwing or racecar driving. To understand the relationship between perceptual learning and perception-based skills, start by considering the following case. Williams and Davids (1998) reported that when expert soccer players defend opponents, they focus longer on their opponent’s hips than non-experts do. This tuned attention is a long-term change in perception that results from practice or experience. That is, it is an instance of perceptual learning (see section 2.3 below). Such changes certainly serve to enable perception-based skills. For instance, attending to the hips is part of what enables the soccer players to defend well. Since the hips provide a cue for what the offensive player will do next, when the defender attends there, it helps them to do all sorts of things: to keep the offensive player from dribbling by them; to keep the offensive player from completing a pass; and to keep them from shooting and scoring. Without the attentional tuning, the expert soccer players would not be able to perform as high above baseline as they do.
知觉学习可以使基于知觉的技能，但将这些技能与知觉学习区分开来很重要。实际上，正如Stanley和Krakauer（2013）所言，知觉学习本身并没有给你一个正确的技巧。以Stanley和Krakauer为借口的一个原因是，技能相当合理，需要指导（至少是初步的）或观察别人（2013：3）。相反，知觉学习有时可以是无监督的学习（参见Goldstone 2003：241和Goldstone＆Byrge 2015：第3节）。长期的，学习诱导的感知变化有时通过仅仅暴露于刺激而没有任何指示而发生。此外，可以说，正如斯坦利和克拉科尔所说：“我们的技术行动总是在我们的理性控制之下…”（2013：3;另见Stanley＆Williamson即将出版：6）。然而，有一个重要的意义在于哪个人不能控制像上述专家足球运动员那样的注意力注意模式。例如，Goldstone引用了Shiffrin和Schneider着重调整的研究（1977）。在这项研究中，信件被首先用作实验的目标，但后来的信件被用作被忽视的干扰物（Goldstone 1998：589）。由于他们事先接受了这些信件的训练，即使他们试图故意忽视这些信件，受试者的注意力也会因为场景中的信件而自动化。更一般来说，在训练之后，很难理性地控制调整的注意力模式，因为注意力是针对特定的属性自动化的。
Perceptual learning can enable perception-based skills, yet it is important to distinguish these skills from perceptual learning. In fact, arguably, as Stanley and Krakauer (2013) claim, perceptual learning does not in itself give you a skill, properly speaking. One reason why, drawing on Stanley and Krakauer, is that skills quite plausibly require instruction (at least initially), or observation of someone else (2013: 3). Perceptual learning, by contrast, can at times be unsupervised learning (see Goldstone 2003: 241 and Goldstone & Byrge 2015: section 3). Long-term, learning-induced changes in perception sometimes happen through mere exposure to stimuli, and without any instruction whatsoever. Furthermore, arguably, as Stanley and Krakauer put it, “our skilled actions are always under our rational control…” (2013: 3; see also Stanley & Williamson forthcoming: 6). Yet, there is an important sense in which one cannot control a tuned attentional pattern like that of the expert soccer players mentioned above. Goldstone, for instance, cites a study on attentional tuning by Shiffrin and Schneider (1977). In that study, letters were used first as targets in the experiment, but later letters were used as distractors to be ignored (Goldstone 1998: 589). Due to their prior training with the letters, the subjects’ attention became automatic with respect to the letters in the scene, even though they were trying to deliberately ignore them. More generally, after training, it is difficult to rationally control a tuned attentional pattern because the attention is automatic toward particular properties.
1.5.3 Cognitive Penetration
感知学习涉及长期的感知变化 。这个长期标准排除了一些认知渗透的情况，也就是说，一个人的信仰，想法或欲望影响到人们的看法（见Macpherson 2012：24）。例如，要从苏珊娜·西格尔（2012）借鉴一个案件，如果吉尔认为杰克生气，因为她现在认为杰克生气，这不一定是感知学习的情况，因为它不需要是一个长期的变化。毕竟，如果吉尔改变她的信念，杰克很快就会生气，她就不会再看到他的中立的脸色生气了。她的看法将是一个短期的变化，而不是一个长期的变化。所以不会是感性学习的情况。
Perceptual learning involves changes in perception that are long-term. This long-term criterion rules out some cases of cognitive penetration, that is, cases where one’s beliefs, thoughts, or desires influence one’s perception (see Macpherson 2012: 24). For instance, to borrow a case from Susanna Siegel (2012), if Jill sees Jack as angry because she just now believes Jack is angry, this need not be a case of perceptual learning, since it need not be a long-term change. After all, if Jill changes her belief that Jack is angry shortly after, she will no longer see his neutral face as angry. It would be a short-term change in her perception, not a long-term one. And so it would not be a case of perceptual learning.
只是因为一些认知渗透的情况并不是感知学习的情况，所以并不认为没有认知渗透的情况是感知学习的情况。杰里·福多（Jerry Fodor）区分同步渗透和历时渗透，只有后者涉及“经验与培训”（1984：39）。杰克和吉尔的案例是同步渗透的一个例子，渗透不涉及经验和培训。然而，至少有些情感学习的情况可能更适合于时尚渗透的类别。（更多关于感知学习与认知渗透之间的关系，见 3.2节）
Simply because some cases of cognitive penetration are not cases of perceptual learning, however, it does not follow that no cases of cognitive penetration are cases of perceptual learning. Jerry Fodor distinguishes between synchronic penetration and diachronic penetration, where only the latter involves “experience and training” (1984: 39). The case of Jack and Jill is a case of synchronic penetration, one where the penetration does not involve experience and training. However, at least some cases of perceptual learning might more plausibly fit into the category of diachronic penetration. (For more on the relationship between perceptual learning and cognitive penetration, see section 3.2)
1.5.4 Machine Learning
Machine perception seeks “to enable man-made machines to perceive their environments by sensory means as human and animals do” (Nevatia 1982: 1). Standard cases of machine perception involve computers that are able to recognize speech, faces, or types of objects. Some types of machine perception are simply programmed into the device. For instance, some speech recognition devices (especially older ones) are simply programmed to recognize speech, and do not learn beyond what they have been programmed to do. Other types of machine perception involve “machine learning” where the device learns based on the inputs that it receives, often involving some kind of feedback.
Like cases of perceptual learning, machine learning can be either supervised or unsupervised, although these distinctions mean something very specific in the machine case. In supervised learning, builders test the machine’s initial performance on, say, the recognition of whether a given image contains a face. They then measure the performance error and adjust the parameters of the machine to improve performance (LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton 2015: 436). Importantly, in cases of supervised learning, engineers program into the machine which features it should look for when, say, identifying a face. In cases of unsupervised learning, by contrast, the machine does not have information about its target features. The machine merely aims to find similarities in the given images, and if it is successful, the machine comes to group all the faces together according to their similarities (Dy & Brodley 2004: 845).
在机器学习中，一个主要的困难是机器可以发展种族主义和性别歧视模式（例如，参见Crawford 2016）。问题往往是工程师将一套偏倚的图像（例如一组包含太多白人的图像）输入到机器中，机器构建其模型（Crawford 2016）。这表明人类感知学习中潜在的相应的偏见来源，是基于人类通过媒体获得的投入。
In machine learning, one major difficulty is that machines can develop racist and sexist patterns (for several examples, see Crawford 2016). The problem is often that engineers input a biased set of images (such as a set of images that include too many white people) into the machine, from which the machine builds its model (Crawford 2016). This suggests a potential corresponding source of bias in human perceptual learning, based on the inputs that humans receive through media.
- Varieties of Perceptual Learning
心理学文献提供了丰富的感知学习证据。Goldstone（1998）有助于区分文学中四种不同类型的感知学习：差异化，统一化，注意力加权和刺激印记。本节对这四种感知学习进行了调查（进一步的回顾，见Goldstone 2003; Goldstone，Braithwaite，Byrge 2012;以及Goldstone＆Byrge 2015）。
The psychology literature provides ample evidence of perceptual learning. Goldstone (1998) helpfully distinguishes between four different types of perceptual learning in the literature: differentiation, unitization, attentional weighting, and stimulus imprinting. This section surveys these four types of perceptual learning (for further review, see Goldstone 2003; Goldstone, Braithwaite, & Byrge 2012; and Goldstone & Byrge 2015).
When most people reflect on perceptual learning, the cases that tend to come to mind are cases of differentiation. In differentiation, a person comes to perceive the difference between two properties, where they could not perceive this difference before. It is helpful to think of William James’ case of a person learning to distinguish between the upper and lower half of a particular kind of wine. Prior to learning, one cannot perceive the difference between the upper and lower half. However, through practice one becomes able to distinguish between the upper and lower half. This is a paradigm case of differentiation.
心理学家研究实验室环境中的差异化。在一次这样的研究中，实验者从六个月到三年之间的六名本地日语人士中，曾在美国居住过（Logan，Lively，＆Pisoni，1991）。受试者不是英语母语者。实验者发现他们能够训练这些科目，以更好地区分音素/ r /和/ l /。这是一个改善差异化的情况，在这些情况下，受试者变得更好地认识到两个属性之间的差异，他们之前有更多的麻烦。
Psychologists have studied differentiation in lab environments. In one such study, experimenters took six native Japanese speakers who had lived in the United States from between six months and three years (Logan, Lively, & Pisoni 1991). The subjects were not native English speakers. The experimenters found that they were able to train these subjects to better distinguish between the phonemes /r/ and /l/. This is a case of improved differentiation, where the subjects became better at perceiving the difference between two properties, which they had more trouble telling apart before.
Unitization is the counterpart to differentiation. In unitization, a person comes to perceive as a single property, what they previously perceived as two or more distinct properties. One example of unitization is the perception of written words. When we perceive a written word in English, we do not simply perceive two or more distinct letters. Rather, we perceive those letters as a single word. Put another way, we perceive written words as a single unit (see Smith & Haviland 1972). This is not the case with non-words. When we perceive short strings of letters that are not words, we do not perceive them as a single unit. Goldstone and Byrge provide a list of items for which there is empirical evidence of such unitization:
birds, words, grids of lines, random wire structures, fingerprints, artificial blobs, and three-dimensional creatures made from simple geometric components. (2015: 823)
While unitization and differentiation are converses, the one unifying and the other distinguishing, Goldstone and Byrge also conceive of them as “flip sides of the same coin” (2015: 823). This is because, as they put it, both unitization and differentiation “involve creating perceptual units…” (2015: 823). Regardless of whether the unit arises from the fusion or the differentiation of two other units, both instances of perceptual learning involve the creation of new perceptual units.
2.3 Attentional Weighting
在注意的权重下，通过实践或经验，人们系统地参与某些对象和属性，远离其他对象和属性。在体育研究中已经显示了范例加权范例，例如，已经发现，专家击剑者更多地参与对手的上肢区域，而非专家更多地参与对手的上肢区域（Hagemann et al。等等，2010）。拳击手学习时，练习或经验会调整注意力，将其转移到某些区域，并远离其他区域。
In attentional weighting, through practice or experience people come to systematically attend toward certain objects and properties and away from other objects and properties. Paradigm cases of attentional weighting have been shown in sports studies, where it has been found, for instance, that expert fencers attend more to their opponents’ upper trunk area, while non-experts attend more to their opponents’ upper leg area (Hagemann et al., 2010). Practice or experience modulates attention as fencers learn, shifting it towards certain areas and away from other areas.
In the case of the expert fencer, a shift in the weight of attention to the opponents’ upper trunk area facilitates the expert’s fencing skills. However, shifts in attentional weighting can also fail to facilitate skills or even stifle them. For example, a new golfer with inadequate coaching might develop the bad habit of attending to their putter while putting, rather than learning to keep their “eye on the ball.” This unhelpful shift in attentional weighting may well stifle the new golfer’s ability to become a skillful putter.
了解加权注意力的一个方法是为关注，已成为自动相对于特定的属性。换句话说，当专家击剑者参加上肢区时，这种注意力不再受她的意图所限制（参见Wu 2014：33，更多关于自动化的说明）。相反，作为实践的结果，专家击剑者的注意力现在 相对于主干区域是自动的。这个斜体部分很重要。例如，韦恩恩的注意事项，可能会询问注意过程中不同特征的注意是否自动：“注意力是指向什么程度，持续多长时间，什么具体特征场景等“（第34页）。在专家击剑的情况下，似乎她的注意力相对于主干区域是自动的，即使在其他方面不是自动的。这种自动化是她学习过程的产物。
One way to understand weighted attention is as attention that has become automatic with respect to particular properties. In other words, when the expert fencer attends to the upper trunk area, this attention is no longer governed by her intention (see Wu 2014: 33, for more on this account of automaticity). Rather, as the result of practice, the expert fencer’s attention is now automatic with respect to the trunk area. This italicized part is important. On Wayne Wu’s account of attention, for instance, one might ask whether attention is automatic with respect to different features of the process of attention: “where attention is directed and in what sequence, how long it is sustained, to what specific features in the scene, and so on” (p. 34). In the case of the expert fencer, plausibly her attention is automatic with respect to the trunk area, even if it is not automatic in other respects. This automaticity is the product of her learning process.
2.4 Stimulus Imprinting
回想一下，在单元化中，以前看起来像两个或更多对象，属性或事件的以后看起来像单个对象，属性或事件。“刺激印记”的情况就像在结束状态下整合的情况（你检测到整个模式），但不需要先前的状态 - 不需要这种模式以前看起来像两个或多个对象，属性，或事件。这是因为在刺激印记中，感知系统为整个刺激或刺激物的部分建立专门的检测器，对象被重复暴露（Goldstone 1998：591）。例如，下颞皮质中的细胞可以对特定熟悉的面孔有更高的反应（Perrett等，1984，引自Goldstone 1998：594）。这些专门的检测器有帮助的一个领域是不清楚或快速呈现的刺激（Goldstone 1998：592）。刺激印记完全没有指导或监督（Goldstone 2003：241）。
Recall that in unitization, what previously looked like two or more objects, properties, or events later looks like a single object, property, or event. Cases of “stimulus imprinting” are like cases of unitization in the end state (you detect a whole pattern), but there is no need for the prior state—no need for that pattern to have previously looked like two or more objects, properties, or events. This is because in stimulus imprinting, the perceptual system builds specialized detectors for whole stimuli or parts of stimuli to which a subject has been repeatedly exposed (Goldstone 1998: 591). Cells in the inferior temporal cortex, for instance, can have a heightened response to particular familiar faces (Perrett et al., 1984, cited in Goldstone 1998: 594). One area where these specialized detectors are helpful is with unclear or quickly presented stimuli (Goldstone 1998: 592). Stimulus imprinting happens entirely without guidance or supervision (Goldstone 2003: 241).
- The Philosophical Significance of Perceptual Learning
Perceptual learning is philosophically significant both in itself, and for the role that it has played in prior philosophical discussions. Sections 3.1–3.4 will focus on the latter. However, there are good reasons to see perceptual learning as philosophically significant in itself, independently from the role that it has played in prior philosophical discussions.
为什么感性学习具有哲学意义？一个原因是它说出一些有关感知本质的观点 - 这种观念比从第一人称角度来看更为复杂。具体来说，感知学习的发生意味着感知状态的原因不仅仅是我们眼前的环境中的物体，而是乍看起来。相反，考虑到感知学习的现实，我们对先前认识的看法有很长的因果关系。例如，当专家品酒师品尝赤霞珠时，单独的一杯葡萄酒不是她感知状态的唯一原因。相反，她的感性状态的原因包括以前的葡萄酒和以前对这些葡萄酒的看法。说出这一点的一个方法是说，这种感觉不仅仅是对我们感官的直接投入。它与我们以前的经验有关。
Why is perceptual learning philosophically significant? One reason is that it says something about the very nature of perception—that perception is more complex than it might seem from the first-person point of view. Specifically, the fact that perceptual learning occurs means that the causes of perceptual states are not just the objects in our immediate environment, as it seems at first glance. Rather, given the reality of perceptual learning, there is a long causal history to our perceptions that involves prior perception. When the expert wine-taster tastes the Cabernet Sauvignon, for example, that glass of wine alone is not the sole cause of her perceptual state. Rather, the cause of her perceptual state includes prior wines and prior perceptions of those wines. One way to put this is to say that perception is more than the immediate inputs into our senses. It is tied to our prior experiences.
感性学习在哲学上是重要的另一种方式是因为它显示了感知是大脑和世界的产物。在这方面，常态机制的作用与感知学习的作用之间有一些相似之处，因为这两者都涉及到大脑在以超出知觉输入的方式构建感知中发挥作用。恒定性机制，如涉及形状，大小和颜色恒定性的那些机制，是脑机制，使我们能够在距离或照明的变化中更稳定地感知形状，大小和颜色。在恒定的情况下，大脑操纵来自世界的输入，这样可以让观众更容易地跟踪形状，大小或颜色。同样，在感知学习的情况下，大脑也会操纵来自世界的输入。在许多情况下，这实际上可能使感知更有帮助，因为当通过学习感知系统以特定方式来重视注意力时，例如，针对与识别赤霞珠相关的特征。感知学习可能会提高认知认知状态，使感知者在知识方面处于更好的位置（参见Siegel 2017）。同时，人们可以不正确地学习，导致无助的观念，因为没有足够的辅导的新的高尔夫球手在施放时不会参加高尔夫球，而是发挥参与推杆的坏习惯。感知学习可能会提高认知认知状态，使感知者在知识方面处于更好的位置（参见Siegel 2017）。同时，人们可以不正确地学习，导致无助的观念，因为没有足够的辅导的新的高尔夫球手在施放时不会参加高尔夫球，而是发挥参与推杆的坏习惯。感知学习可能会提高认知认知状态，使感知者在知识方面处于更好的位置（参见Siegel 2017）。同时，人们可以不正确地学习，导致无助的观念，因为没有足够的辅导的新的高尔夫球手在施放时不会参加高尔夫球，而是发挥参与推杆的坏习惯。
Another way in which perceptual learning is philosophically significant is because it shows how perception is a product of both the brain and the world. In this respect, there are some similarities between the role of constancy mechanisms and the role of perceptual learning, in that both involve the brain playing a role in structuring perception in a way that goes beyond the perceptual input. Constancy mechanisms, such as those involved in shape, size, and color constancy, are brain mechanisms that allow us to perceive shapes, sizes, and colors more stably across variations in distance or illumination. In cases of constancy, the brain manipulates the input from the world, and this allows the perceiver to track the shape, size, or color more easily. Similarly, in cases of perceptual learning, the brain manipulates the input from the world. In many cases, this may actually make the perception more helpful, as when through learning the perceptual system weights attention in a particular way, say, towards the features relevant for identifying a Cabernet Sauvignon. Perceptual learning might upgrade the epistemic status of perception, putting the perceiver in a better position with respect to knowledge (see Siegel 2017). At the same time, people can learn incorrectly, leading to perceptions that are unhelpful, as when a new golfer with inadequate coaching develops the bad habit of attending to their putter while putting, rather than attending to the golf ball.
Perceptual learning is philosophically significant in itself. In addition, the rest of section 3 goes on to explore the role that perceptual learning has played in prior philosophical discussions.
3.1 The Contents of Perception
In the philosophy literature, cases of perceptual learning have often been used to show that through learning we come to represent new properties in perception, which we did not represent prior to learning. Siegel (2006, 2010), for instance, asks us to suppose that we have been tasked to cut down all and only the pine trees in a particular grove of trees. After several months pass, she says, pine trees might begin to look different to us. This is a case of perceptual learning, a long-term change in our perception following practice or experience with pine trees. Siegel uses the case to argue that perception comes to represent kind properties, like the property of being a pine tree. The idea is that the best way to explain the change in perception is that perception represents the property of being a pine tree after, but not before, learning takes place. That property becomes part of the content of perception: it comes to be presented in perceptual experience (for more background on the contents of perception, see Siegel 2016).
托马斯·里德（Thomas Reid）的获得性观念的概念最近被解释为与西格尔松树案相似的方式。据雷德说，我们的一些看法，即获得的看法，是以往经验的结果。例如，里德写道，如何通过经验我们可能会“看到这是cyder的味道”，或者“这是苹果的气味”，或者说“这是教练通过的声音” （1997）：171）。Rebecca Copenhaver（2010年，2016年）将里德解释为声称通过经验属性，如苹果酒，苹果和 教练，可以成为我们的观点内容的一部分。
Thomas Reid’s notion of acquired perception has recently been interpreted in a way similar to Siegel’s pine tree case. According to Reid, some of our perceptions, namely acquired perceptions, are the result of prior experience. For instance, Reid writes about how through experience we might come to “perceive that this is the taste of cyder,” or “that this is the smell of an apple,” or that “this [is] the sound of a coach passing” ( 1997: 171). Rebecca Copenhaver (2010, 2016) has interpreted Reid as claiming that through experience properties like being a cider, being an apple, and being a coach can come to be part of the content of our perception.
感知学习的情况也可能被用来表明，通过学习我们来代表感知中的新属性，即使这些属性是简单的低级属性，如颜色，形状，纹理和裸露的声音，而不是高级别的属性像 一棵松树或是一个苹果酒。例如，在讨论珠宝商的感知特长，14 个 -century印度哲学家韦丹塔·德桑卡写入，
Cases of perceptual learning might also be used to show that through learning we come to represent new properties in perception, even if those properties are simply low-level properties like colors, shapes, textures, and bare sounds, rather than high-level kind properties like being a pine tree or being a cider. For instance, in discussing the perceptual expertise of jewelers, the 14th-century Hindu philosopher Vedānta Deśika writes,
[T]he difference among colours [of a precious stone], which was first concealed by their similarity, is eventually made apparent as something sensual…. (Freschi [trans.] manuscript, Other Internet Resources, pp. 12–13)
In this case, the jeweler comes to perceive new colors in the gemstone, which others cannot perceive. This is a case where through learning someone comes to perceive a new low-level property.
The cases from both Reid and Vedānta Deśika both speak to the internal complexity of perception mentioned in the previous section. If Vedānta Deśika’s description of the jeweler case is accurate, then perception is more than the inputs into our senses, since both an expert jeweler and a non-expert can have the same visual inputs, but have different perceptions. Similarly, to take a new example from Reid, suppose that a farmer acquires the ability to literally see the rough amount corn in a heap ( 1997: 172). Since both a farmer and a non-farmer can have the same visual inputs, but have different perceptions, the causes of their perceptions are not just restricted to the immediate objects out in their environment. Perception is more complex than that.
One of the most detailed contemporary discussions of cases of perceptual learning is found in Siewert (1998: section 7.9). Siewert discusses in detail the role that learning plays in altering perceptual phenomenology, although he stops short of saying that this affects the high-level contents of perception. He writes, for instance, that there is a difference in perceptual phenomenology between just seeing “something shaped, situated, and colored in a certain way,” and recognizing that thing as a sunflower (or another type) (1998: 255). Siewert also writes that a person might look different to you after you know them for a long time than they did the first time you met them, and that your neighborhood might look different to you after you have lived there for a long time than the first time you moved in (pp. 256, 258). Furthermore, he writes about how a chessboard in midgame might look differently to a chess player than to a novice, and how a car engine might look differently to a mechanic than to someone unfamiliar with cars (1998: 258). These are all examples where learning affects one’s sensory phenomenology.
Several cases of perceptual learning in the philosophical literature involve language learning, both in the case of written and spoken language. As an example of the former, Christopher Peacocke writes that there is a difference
between the experience of a perceiver completely unfamiliar with Cyrillic script seeing a sentence in that script and the experience of one who understands a language written in that script. (1992: 89)
关于口语，正如凯西·奥卡拉汉（Casey O’Callaghan，2011）指出的，有几位哲学家声称，一个人学习口语之后，这种语言的声音听起来与他们不一样（O’Callaghan引用了1995年： 234; Strawson 2010：5-6; Tye 2000：61; Siegel 2006：490; Prinz 2006：452;和Bayne 2009：390）。例如，Ned Block写道：“在学习语言之前和之后，这里听到法语听到的声音有什么区别”（1995：234）。认为这种差异是可以解释的，因为在学习语言之后，一个人听到这些单词的含义，在学习语言之前他们不在那里。在这种观点下，意义将成为听觉知觉内容的一部分。然而，O’Callaghan（2011）否认了这一点（另见O’Callaghan 2015和Reiland 2015）。他认为差异实际上是由于一种感性学习。具体来说，通过学习，我们来听取新语言特有的语音功能。正如奥卡拉汗所说，这些语音特征，而不是意义，解释了听到一种新的语言是什么样的。
With regard to spoken language, as Casey O’Callaghan (2011) points out, several philosophers have made the claim that after a person learns a spoken language, sounds in that language comes to sound different to them (O’Callaghan cites Block 1995: 234; Strawson 2010: 5–6; Tye 2000: 61; Siegel 2006: 490; Prinz 2006: 452; and Bayne 2009: 390). Ned Block, for instance, writes, “[T]here is a difference in what it is like to hear sounds in French before and after you have learned the language” (1995: 234). It is tempting to think that this difference is explicable in terms of the fact that, after learning a language, a person hears the meanings of the words, where they do not before learning the language. On such a view, meanings would be part of the contents of auditory perception. However, O’Callaghan (2011) denies this (see also O’Callaghan 2015 and Reiland 2015). He argues that the difference is in fact due to a kind of perceptual learning. Specifically, through learning we come to hear phonological features specific to the new language. As O’Callaghan argues, these phonological features, not the meanings, explain what it’s like to hear a new language.
By contrast, Brogaard (forthcoming) argues that meanings are in fact part of the content of perception (see also Pettit 2010). After offering arguments against the opposing view, she relies on evidence about perceptual learning to help make the positive case for her view. In particular, she uses evidence about perceptual learning to rebut the view that we use background information about context and combine it with what we hear, in order to get meanings. Instead, she argues, language learning is perceptual in nature. She points to changes in how we perceive utterances, more in chunks rather than in parts, as a result of learning. Background information directly influences what we hear, she argues, altering how language sounds to us.
Both Siegel’s pine tree case and the case of hearing a new language fundamentally involve phenomenal contrasts. That is, the motivating intuition in both cases is that there is a contrast in sensory phenomenology between two perceptual experiences. Interestingly, in both cases the phenomenal contrast is due to learning. The question in both the pine tree case and the new language case is what explains the difference in sensory phenomenology. Siegel argues that the best explanation in the pine tree case is that the property of being a pine (and, more generally, natural kind properties) can come to be represented in perception. O’Callaghan (2011) argues that the best explanation for the difference in sensory phenomenology in the new language case is that we come to hear phonological features specific to the new language. Brogaard (forthcoming) argues that the best explanation in that case is that we come to hear meanings in the new language.
3.2 Cognitive Penetration
Recall that cases of cognitive penetration are cases where one’s beliefs, thoughts, or desires influence one’s perception (see Macpherson 2012: 24). One role of perceptual learning in the philosophical literature has been to explain away putative cases of cognitive penetration. For instance, it might seem at first glance that Siegel’s pine tree case is a case of cognitive penetration, a case where one’s newly acquired concept of a pine tree influences one’s perception. Connolly (2014b) and Arstila (2016), however, have both argued that the best way to understand Siegel’s pine tree case is not as a case of cognitive penetration, but rather through the particular mechanisms of perceptual learning. Connolly counts it as a case of attentional weighting, while Arstila understands it as involving both unitization and differentiation.
One reason why perceptual learning is a good instrument for explaining away putative cases of cognitive penetration is the following. In cases of perceptual learning, it is the external environment that drives the perceptual changes. As Raftopoulos puts it, “perceptual learning does not necessarily involve cognitive top-down penetrability but only data-driven processes” (2001: 493). For putative cases of cognitive penetration, the strategy for the perceptual learning theorist is to show how the perceptual changes involved may have been data-driven instead of top-down. Several philosophers have used this strategy at times, including Pylyshyn (1999: section 6.3), Brogaard and Gatzia (2015: 2), as well as Stokes (2015: 94), and Deroy (2013) might be interpreted in that way as well.
在感性学习方面解释认知渗透的推定案例的一个例外是Cecchi（2014）。Cecchi认为，Schwartz，Maquet和Frith（2002）中发现的一种感知学习的一个特殊情况 - 应该算作认知渗透的一个例子。有关研究发现由于学习而导致的主要视觉皮质发生变化，而且这些变化也是由影响主要视觉皮质的大脑中的较高区域引起的。因为知觉变化是自上而下的影响的结果，Cecchi认为，这种感知学习的情况应该算作认知渗透的一个例子。
One exception to the trend of explaining away putative cases of cognitive penetration in terms of perceptual learning is Cecchi (2014). Cecchi argues that a particular case of perceptual learning—that found in Schwartz, Maquet, and Frith (2002)—should count as a case of cognitive penetration. The study in question found changes in the primary visual cortex due to learning, and also that these changes were brought about by higher areas in the brain influencing the primary visual cortex. Because the perceptual changes were the result of top-down influence, Cecchi argues that this case of perceptual learning should count as a case of cognitive penetration.
3.3 The Theory-Ladenness of Observation
One traditional debate in the philosophy of science is whether scientific observation is permeated with the theory of the scientist, or theory-laden (see the entry on theory and observation in science). As Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis point out, when asking whether observation is theory-laden, the answer will depend in part on what it means for a subject to possess a theory (2015: 18). On their view, theories can be tacit, rather than just “having a set of beliefs and concepts” (p. 18).
Assuming that theories can be held tacitly, perceptual learning might plausibly play a role in making observation theory laden. Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis, for instance, ask us to imagine a scientist who has undergone perceptual learning in her expert domain (2015: 19). Specifically, through repeated exposure to items in her expert domain, she has developed perceptual sensitivity to certain features, in accordance with her professional needs. This includes learned attention to particular dimensions, and involves physical changes early in her visual system (p. 19). As a result, the scientist might quite literally see the world differently within her expert domain than someone from outside her expertise would see it.
Such a case suggests that perceptual learning can make observation theory-laden. The scientist’s perceptual system comes to shape the kind of visual information that makes it into the scientist’s conscious perception, and does so based on her professional needs. As Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis put it, the case suggests that non-cognitive, clearly perceptual influences on incoming visual information can be indirect bearers of the kinds of theoretical commitments that we usually think of as the content of conceptually couched theories. (2015: 19)
Although the case does not involve explicit beliefs directly influencing perception, arguably it involves a theory being held tacitly and appropriated into one’s perceptual system.
根据思想的模块化观点（Fodor 1983），感知涉及的基本系统是从其外部的信息封装的，不包括其输入（参见Robbins 2015，用于模块化的总结）。那么乍看之下，感性学习的例子就是挑战思想模糊的观点，至少在这个主题所涉及到的任何背景理论中都涉及到对感知的调制。然而，重要的是要注意，Fodor自己似乎允许这种感知学习的情况。虽然他认为这种观念是同步不可穿透的，但他允许历时性渗透的可能性，即“经验和训练会影响背景理论对知觉机制的可及性”（1984：39）。
According to the modular view of the mind (Fodor 1983), the basic systems involved in perception are encapsulated from information outside of it, excluding its inputs (see Robbins 2015, for a summary of modularity). It might then seem at first glance that cases of perceptual learning challenge the view that the mind is modular, at least insofar as they involve the modulation of perception through any background theory that the subject has. However, it is important to note that Fodor himself seems to allow for such cases of perceptual learning. While he thinks that perception is synchronically impenetrable, he allows for the possibility of diachronic penetration, that is, cases where “experience and training can affect the accessibility of background theory to perceptual mechanisms” (1984: 39).
Why think that a modular view of the mind should allow for diachronic penetration? When Fodor allows for diachronic penetration, he does so because the alternative is to say that all modular systems are specified endogenously (1984: 39). Fodor admits that this alternative would be too extreme, and he points out, for instance, that children learn something from hearing a language. In other words, the modules for language are not just specified endogenously. However, Fodor is conservative about the scope of diachronic penetration, suggesting that it may only happen within strict limits, perhaps limits that are themselves endogenously defined (1984: 39–40).
Other philosophers have argued that diachronic penetration of perception undermines modularity. Churchland (1988), for instance, sees Fodor’s allowance of diachronic penetration as “grudgingly conceded,” and he argues that diachronic penetration is in fact widespread, rather than something that happens within strict limits (p. 176). One such case, raised by Churchland, is the case of perceiving music. Churchland argues that a person who knows the relevant music theory and vocabulary “perceives, in any composition whether great or mundane, a structure, development, and rationale that is lost on the untrained ear” (1988: 179). Fodor replies that it is unclear whether such cases are genuinely perceptual (1988: 195). He suggests another possibility, which is that the person who knows the relevant music theory does not perceive it differently, but rather forms different beliefs about the music. Furthermore, even if the case is genuinely perceptual, Fodor replies that it could be that a trained ear results simply from repeated exposure to the relevant music, rather than through knowledge of theory (1988: 195).
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